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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 3, Utah Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was the trial court's determination that $88,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees 
was due and owing by Dewsnup on April 29, 1994, correct? 
This question presents a mixed question of law and fact. Whether attorneys fees are 
recoverable is a question of law reviewed for correctness. R.T Nielsen v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1119 (Utah 2002). The amount of attorneys fees awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
2. Did the trial court properly determine that $5,000 in attorneys fees and costs 
were unpaid, due and owing by Dewsnup on December 5, 1980? 
This question presents a mixed question of law and fact. Whether attorneys fees are 
recoverable is a question of law reviewed for correctness. R.T. Nielsen v. Cook, 40 P.3d 
1119 (Utah 2002). The amount of attorneys fees awarded is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
3. In granting Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment and in denying Dewsnup's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, did the trial court properly determine that: 
a. The non-judicial sale was not barred by the statute of limitations; 
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b. Dewsnup was not entitled to relief on her claim alleging that unsecured 
debt was included in the foreclosure action; 
c. The one-action rule does not apply; 
d. The sale was not defective for lack of notice; and 
e. There were no genuine issues of material fact preventing an award of 
summary judgment to Timm. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views the facts in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below and gives no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law; those conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Bearden v. Croft, 31 
P.3d 537 (Utah 2001). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code are 
determinative of Dewsnup' s claims: 
1. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c); 
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); and 
3. 11 U.S.C. §506. 
The full text of these statutes is set forth in the Addendum. 
The following provisions of the Utah Code Annotated and the Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration regarding trustee's sales are determinative of Dewsnup's claims: 
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1. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-26; 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29; 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41; 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1; and 
5. Rule 4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, subparagraph (2). 
The full text of these statutes is set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action by secured creditors to recover amounts due, including interest and 
attorneys fees incurred to collect the Notes and protect the Plaintiffs security. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This case comes before this Court for the fourth time. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 
1178 (Utah 1993) (Timm I); Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (Timm II); Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 990 P.2d 942 (Utah 1999) (Timm III). 
In 1978, Defendants Aletha Dewsnup and her now-deceased husband, T. LaMar 
Dewsnup ("Dewsnup") borrowed $119,000 from the Plaintiffs (collectively referred to 
hereinafter as "Timm"). Dewsnup executed three Promissory Notes totaling $ 119,000. The 
Promissory Notes were secured by a Trust Deed, certain water rights, and a security interest 
in a real estate contract entered into by Dewsnup on property known as the "Arrow 
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Property." The Promissory Notes and Trust Deed are attached hereto in the Addendum. The 
property included in the Trust Deed is referred to in the record as the "Oak City Property" 
and the "Deseret Property." 
Dewsnup failed to pay the Promissory Notes when due in June 1980. Additionally, 
Dewsnup failed to make an installment payment on the Arrow Contract due in June 1980 and 
to pay the property tax payment due November 30,1980. In order to protect Timm's security 
interest on the Arrow Property, Timm was required to make the necessary tax payment and 
the required installment payment on that contract. Dewsnup failed to pay amounts due to 
Timm on demand and Timm therefore brought suit in the Fourth District Court of Millard 
County, State of Utah. 
The trial court granted Timm summary judgment in April of 1981. Shortly thereafter, 
Dewsnup filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. The initial Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition 
was dismissed, and a subsequent Chapter 11 petition was dismissed with prejudice by the 
Bankruptcy Court. Dewsnup then filed a Chapter 7 petition for discharge. In conjunction 
with her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, Dewsnup also filed an adversary proceeding in the 
Bankruptcy Court seeking to strip Timm's liens from Dewsnup's property included in the 
Trust Deed and the judgment of the state trial court. 
Following adverse decisions from the Bankruptcy Court, the United States District 
Court, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally the United States Supreme Court, 
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Dewsnupv. Timm, 112 S.Ct.773,116L.Ed.2d903 (1992), Dewsnup filed a motion with the 
Fourth Judicial District Court to amend her counterclaim. The court denied her motion to 
amend and Dewsnup appealed. This Court reversed and remanded to consider the amended 
counterclaim and reconsider Timm's summary judgment. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 
(Utah 1993) (Timm I). On remand, the District Court allowed Dewsnup to amend her 
counterclaim but denied her motion to reconsider the 1981 summary judgment. Dewsnup 
appealed that decision and this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part in Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (Timm II). 
On remand after Timm II, the trial court again granted summary judgment to Timm, 
dismissing Dewsnup's counterclaim. Upon Dewsnup's appeal, this Court issued its opinion 
in Timm v. Dewsnup, 990 P.2d 942 (Utah 1999) (Timm III) and remanded to determine the 
amount of attorneys fees and costs owed by Dewsnup on the Notes and to determine 
Dewsnup's summary judgment issues. 
On remand from Timm III, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and found 
that, at the time of the non-judicial sale on the property in 1994, there was $88,911.67 in 
costs and attorneys fees that were due and owing from Dewsnup to Timm (See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached hereto in the Addendum). Subsequent to its findings 
and conclusions on the fees, the trial court considered the parties' cross motions for summary 
judgment. The court granted Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissed Dewsnup's 
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counterclaim in its entirety, and denied Dewsnup's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The court's Memorandum Decision explaining its ruling and the final Judgment are attached 
hereto in the Addendum. 
Statement of Facts 
On June 1, 1978, LaMar and Aletha Dewsnup borrowed $119,00 from Timm and 
executed three promissory notes (the "Promissory Notes") in favor of Timm. Timm /, 851 
P.2datl l79. 
At the same time, Dewsnup executed a Trust Deed and an Amended Trust Deed 
(collectively, the "Trust Deed") to secure the Promissory Notes. Id. 
As additional security for the Promissory Notes, Dewsnup also signed an Assignment 
of Contract (the "Assignment of Contract"). The Assignment of Contract gave Timm a 
security interest in a purchase contract whereby Dewsnup was purchasing additional farm 
land (the "Arrow Property") from Arrow Investment Company (the "Arrow Contract"). Id. 
On June 1, 1980, the Promissory Notes came due, but Dewsnup failed to make any 
payment on the loan. Id. Dewsnup had also failed to make the January 2, 1980, annual 
installment payment on the Arrow Contract when due and failed to pay the 1979 property 
taxes on the Arrow Property as required by the Arrow Contract. Id. 
The Assignment of Contract allowed Timm to make Dewsnup's missed payments 
under the Arrow Contract, and required Dewsnup to reimburse Timm for those payments: 
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[Dewsnups] agree that in the event they are in default [under the Arrow 
Contract] that [Timm] may make payments due under and pursuant to [the 
Arrow Contract] and will be reimbursed for the same by [Dewsnup]. 
R. at 836. 
To preserve their security interest in the Arrow Contract, on June 2,1980, Timm made 
the January 2, 1980, Arrow Contract payment in the amount of $47,880.50, and paid the 
delinquent 1979 property taxes on the Arrow Property in the amount of $2,085.71. Timm /, 
851 P.2d at 1179; Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1387. 
On September 16,1980, Timm filed the Complaint herein against Dewsnup seeking 
judgment for the unrecovered principal and interest on the $119,000 loan, plus $49,966.21 
which Timm paid for the 1979 property taxes and the 1980 Arrow Contract payment, and for 
Timm's attorneys fees and costs to collect the Notes. Dewsnup counterclaimed against 
Timm. Timm /, 851 P.2d at 1180. 
In December of 1980, Dewsnup paid Timm only the principal and interest due on the 
$119,000 loan. Dewsnup failed and refused to pay any costs and attorneys fees. Dewsnup 
also refused to reimburse Timm for the 1979 property taxes on the Arrow Property 
($2,085.71) and the $47,880.50 installment payment on the Arrow Contract. Id. 
Because of Dewsnup's refusal to make any further payments, Timm then moved for 
summary judgment, seeking a judgment for the unpaid attorneys fees and costs incurred, as 
well as the $49,966 advanced on the Arrow Contract. Id. 
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On April 24, 1981, the trial court entered a Summary Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure (the "Judgment"), granting Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court 
awarded Timm judgment against Dewsnup for $49,966.21 (consisting of the Arrow Property 
taxes of $2,085.71 and the January 2,1980, Arrow Contract installment of $47,880.50) and 
awarded judgment on the Notes for the unpaid $6,985.00 "costs of collection, including 
attorney's fees." Id. 
The Judgment also held that the $49,966.21 and the $6,985.00 were secured by the 
Trust Deed. Later, in Timm II, this Court determined that the Arrow Contract payments were 
not secured by the Trust Deed. However, the $49,966.21 judgment itself was not altered by 
that determination and remained a judgment against Dewsnup. Timm II, 921 P.2d 1381, 
1388. 
In late April 1981, shortly following the trial court's grant of summary judgment to 
Timm, Dewsnup filed her first Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. Timm /, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1180; Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). 
Dewsnup's first bankruptcy petition was dismissed, as was her second petition. In 
1984, Dewsnup filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. In conjunction with that Chapter 7 
proceeding, Dewsnup filed an adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court, seeking to strip 
Timm's liens off the property described in the Trust Deed. Id. 
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Between 1984 and 1992, Dewsnup's adversary proceeding remained pending in the 
Bankruptcy Court and was ultimately decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1992 
with a final dismissal of Dewsnup's adversary claims and a preservation of Timm's security. 
Dewsnup v. 77mm, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992). 
On January 7, 1991, the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee abandoned Dewsnup's 
counterclaim. Two weeks later, in the instant action, Dewsnup filed a motion to amend her 
counterclaim and a motion to reconsider and set aside the trial court's 1981 summary 
judgment award. The trial court denied both motions. See Timm 7, 851 P.2d at 1180. 
Dewsnup appealed, and in Timm I (issued April 1993) this Court reversed the trial 
court's order and remanded the case with direction that Dewsnup be allowed to file an 
amended counterclaim and that the court reconsider the summary judgment order of 1981. 
Id. 
In late March 1994, Timm scheduled a trustee's sale of the property for April 29, 
1994. R. at 839. At the trustee's sale on April 29, 1994, Timm bid on the Trust Deed 
Property for $ 115,000.00 in debt that Timm claimed was secured by the Trust Deed and due 
and owing. R. at 841. 
On remand after Timm 7, the District Court allowed Dewsnup to amend her 
counterclaim but refused to disturb or set aside its 1981 order granting summary judgment 
to Timm. Dewsnup appealed that decision. See Timm II, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). 
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On appeal, this Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court affirmed the 
summary judgment in favor of Timm but held that the $49,966.21 payment on the Arrow 
Contract was not secured by the Trust Deed. This Court stated: 
An examination of the "Assignment of Contract" reveals that the Dewsnups 
were obligated to repay the lenders the $49,966.21 paid under the Arrow 
Contract. However, this debt was not secured by the trust deed, the Arrow 
property, or the water rights specified in the security agreement. Such 
properties secured only the $ 119,000 debt on the promissory notes. Therefore 
the trial court's legal conclusion that the $49,966.21 was secured by the 
"mortgage and security agreement... as well as the trust deed property was 
error." 
Timm II, 921 P.2d at 1387-1388. This Court reversed and remanded "to determine whether 
costs and fees were outstanding on the promissory notes at the time of the Judgment." Id. 
On remand, Timm presented sworn evidence that costs and fees were outstanding on 
the Notes at the time of judgment. Again, the trial court granted Timm's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Dewsnup appealed again. On appeal, this Court recognized that 
Dewsnup owed fees but that there was no finding of fact as to the amount of fees properly 
owed. This Court again remanded the case with specific instruction to determine the amount 
of costs and attorneys fees which remained unpaid on the Note at the time of the Trust Deed 
sale in 1994. See Timm III, 1999 Ut. 105, 990 P.2d at 945 (Utah 1999). 
On November 13, 2000, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found and 
determined that $88,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees were due and owing on the Trust Deed 
on April 29, 1994, the date of the sale. See R. at 783; Findings, Addendum; Tr. 937: p. 56. 
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Following the trial court's findings and conclusions regarding the amount of costs and 
attorneys fees owing on the Note at the time of sale, the parties again filed cross motions for 
summary judgment. In a Memorandum Decision dated August 29, 2001, the trial court 
granted Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Dewsnup's counterclaim in its 
entirety and denied Dewsnup's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See Memorandum 
Decision and the Judgment, Addendum. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court's findings and determination that $88,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees 
was due and owing on April 29, 1994, should be affirmed. Two separate and independent 
bases support the award of costs and attorneys fees to Timm. The Promissory Notes 
underlying the debt at issue contain an attorney fee clause. The costs and attorneys fees were 
reasonably incurred to preserve the Trust Deed security and to collect the Notes. 
Additionally, Timm is entitled to all costs and fees incurred in Dewsnup's bankruptcy 
proceedings under the specific language of the United States Bankruptcy Code and the 
attorneys fee clause in the Notes. 
Dewsnup argues that Timm and the trial court committed error in failing to "allocate" 
attorneys fees among the differing causes of action. Utah law does require allocation. 
However, the trial court's separation of recoverable fees from nonrecoverable fees is 
sufficient to meet this burden. The court's findings are also clearly sufficient to support the 
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determination that the fees awarded were recoverable and were owing and unpaid on the date 
of the non-judicial sale. The testimony of counsel, the sworn attorneys fee affidavits and the 
billing detail introduced below at the evidentiary hearing on costs and attorneys fees clearly 
support the court's findings that all of the fees and costs presented were incurred to protect 
the security and collect the Note. 
Timm's non-judicial sale of the Trust Deed Property did not violate Utah's one-action 
rule. The one-action rule is simply not applicable to this case. Because Timm was the junior 
lienholder on the Trust Deed Property, any excess proceeds from the sale were to be paid 
over to Timm and the one-action rule has no application. Additionally, the one-action rule, 
by its terms, applies only when the debt is secured solely by a mortgage. In this case, the 
debt evidenced by the Promissory Notes was secured by both real property and personal 
property. Moreover, Dewsnup's intervening bankruptcies bar application of the one-action 
rule. Where a bankruptcy eliminates a judgment creditor's right to collect an unsecured debt 
from the judgment debtor, the one-action rule should not act as a bar to collection of the debt 
through non-judicial sale when the debt is secured by a trust deed lien on the real property. 
Timm's non-judicial sale of the property was not barred by the statute of limitations. 
Dewsnup's intervening bankruptcies tolled the running of the statute. The 1994 sale was 
conducted well within any statutory time frame. 
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Dewsnup's claim that the non-judicial sale was conducted for debt which was not 
secured by the Trust Deed does not entitle her to damages. Utah statutes do not require a 
recitation of the amount of the debt at the time of a non-judicial sale. Additionally, Dewsnup 
has failed to show any damages resulting from any alleged inclusion of unsecured debt. 
Dewsnup's claims regarding failure of notice of the non-judicial sale lack merit 
because Dewsnup had actual notice of the non-judicial sale. The trial court correctly 
determined that Timm substantially complied with the statutory notice provisions. 
Additionally, she has failed to demonstrate any prejudice as a result of the alleged lack of 
statutory notice. 
Dewsnup has argued, for the first time on appeal, that there are now genuine issues 
of material fact preventing the trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of Timm. 
This Court should not consider this issue because the claim was not raised in the trial court. 
Additionally, even if the Court were to consider this argument, it is apparent that there is no 
competent evidence proffered below that creates any disputed issue of material fact and that 
there was no tender by Dewsnup of the payment of costs and attorneys fees. Therefore, this 
argument fails. 
The findings and judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. 
31\TimmIV\Bnef-2 13 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT $88,911.67 IN 
COSTS AND FEES WAS DUE AND OWING ON APRIL 29, 1994, IS 
SUPPORTED BY FINDINGS OF FACT AND BY THE EVIDENCE 
BELOW. 
In Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996) (Timm II), this Court remanded this 
matter to the trial court with instructions "to grant Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to reconsider and 
determine what amount, if any, remained outstanding on the promissory notes." Timm II, 
921 P.2d at 1394. In Timm v. Dewsnup, 990 P.2d 942 (Utah 1999) (Timm III), this Court 
explained: 
We directed that determination to be made because it was only for that amount 
that the non-judicial foreclosure sale could be held. The trust deed property 
secured only payment of the three Promissory Notes totaling $119,000. It is 
undisputed that the principal and interest of the notes were paid in full in 
December, 1980. Only the amount, if any, owing for attorneys fees incurred 
in the collection of the notes would continue to be owing and would constitute 
a legal basis for holding a foreclosure sale on the trust deed property We 
must therefore again remand this case to the trial court to determine what 
amount, if any, of attorneys fees remained unpaid on the promissory notes 
when the sale was held. 
Timm III, 990 P.2d at 945 (emphasis added). The determination to be made by the trial court 
was the amount of costs and fees due and owing at the time of the foreclosure sale. 
The trial court in this matter concluded that: 
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1. On December 5, 1980, there were Five Thousand Dollars 
($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes 
which amounts were secured by Plaintiffs Trust Deed on the property. 
2. On April 29, 1994, there were Eighty-Eight Thousand Nine 
Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($88,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees 
due and owing on the Promissory Notes which amounts were secured by 
Plaintiffs Trust Deed on the property. 
R. at 783. The fees incurred from December 1980 to April 1994 were a result of Dewsnup's 
attempts to invalidate the security in Timm's Trust Deed. The court correctly found that the 
fees and costs were reasonably incurred to collect the Promissory Note and defend Timm's 
security. Additionally, the trial court's findings are sufficient to support the conclusions 
noted above. 
A. The Trial Court's Determination that $88,911.67 in Costs and Fees was 
Recoverable was Correct 
Attorneys fees are awarded in this case as a matter of right under both contract and 
statute. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 69A P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985). 
The debt in this case arises from three Promissory Notes, each for varying amounts, 
totaling $119,000.00, and each bearing the same attorneys fees provision: 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or interest as 
herein stipulated, then it shall be optional for the legal holder of this Note to 
declare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable; and proceedings may 
at once be instituted for the recovery of the same by law with accrued interest 
and costs, including reasonable attorneys fees. 
R. at 469-471. 
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From the plain language of the Notes, it is apparent that fees incurred based upon 
Dewsnup's default were recoverable. 
The fees are also recoverable under the United States Bankruptcy Code § 506(b), 
which allows for the recovery of Timm's fees incurred to protect the Trust Deed Property 
during Dewsnup's bankruptcies. 
Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §506) relates to the status of secured 
creditor claims, and provides: 
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 
of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's 
interest in the estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount 
subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent 
that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is 
less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined 
in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use 
of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or 
use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest. 
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by 
property the value of which, after any recovery under subsection (c) of this 
section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the 
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs or 
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose. 
* * * 
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that 
is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) 
or 502(e) of this title; or 
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to 
the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 
of this title. 
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(Emphasis added). In this matter, final judgment in Dewsnup 5s adversary proceeding was 
finally rendered by the United States Supreme Court in 1992. The Court stated: 
Therefore, we hold that §506(d) does not allow petitioner to strip down 
respondent's lien because respondent's claim is secured by a lien and has been 
fully allowed pursuant to §502. 
Dewsnup v. 77mm, 112 S. Ct. 773,776,116 L. Ed. 903,906 (1992) (emphasis added). Thus, 
it is apparent that the Bankruptcy Code provides for recovery of Timm's attorneys fees 
incurred in defending their entitlement to the proceeds from the Trust Deed Property. 
Common law is in accord. In Coastal Production Credit Ass ln. v. Goodson Farms, 
Inc., 319 S.E.2d 650 (N.C. App. 1984), the court determined that a creditor under a 
promissory note was entitled to collect attorneys fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings 
which were instituted by the debtor to avoid the promissory note debt. That court noted: 
The court found as fact that plaintiffs attorney undertook various duties, 
including participating in bankruptcy and foreclosure actions regarding this 
estate and acting as commissioner for sale of the collateral. Plaintiff argues 
that such time was properly chargeable to the collection of the note since it 
was spent preserving for collection the assets of the estate and expediting 
ancillary proceedings used by defendants to delay eventual recovery. 
Defendants argue that the court abused its discretion in allowing such fees. . 
.. [W]e believe that when other actions are reasonably related to the collection 
of the underlying note sued upon, attorneys fees incurred therein may properly 
be awarded . . . . Reasonableness, not arbitrary classification of attorney 
activity, is the key factor under all our attorneys fees statutes. . . . [0]ur result, 
that participation in other proceedings may be allowed as costs, is consistent 
with the position of the United States Supreme Court. That Court has 
approved disallowance of an award of fees in other litigation where such 
proceedings could neither disturb the prosecution of the present suit nor affect 
its outcome. United States v. Equitable Trust Co., 283 U.S. 738,51 S.Ct. 639, 
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75 L.Ed. 1379 (1931). By extension, allowance of fees for participation in 
other proceedings to expedite collection or preserve assets would not constitute 
abuse of discretion. 
Coastal Production, 319 S.E.2d at 655. 
The trial court here found that the fees and costs incurred by Timm both in this action 
and in the corollary bankruptcy proceeding were reasonably incurred to collect sums due 
under the Promissory Notes. R. at 780-781. Such sums were recoverable under the attorneys 
fees clause in the Promissory Notes and under the Bankruptcy Code. 
In the face of protracted litigation by Dewsnup in the Bankruptcy Court, the attorneys 
fees incurred by Timm in these proceedings were absolutely necessary to protect Timm's 
security interest in the debt owed by Dewsnup. Dewsnup's Amended Complaint in the 
adversary bankruptcy proceeding sought the following relief: 
1. The Court enter an order removing the June 1,1978 Trust Deed, 
with Defendants as beneficiary, from the property of the debtors because the 
underlying note has been satisfied and the Trust Deed is invalid. 
2. The Court enter an order avoiding Defendants' security interest 
on the real property of the Plaintiffs to the extent that the security interest 
exceeds the value of the real property under 11 U.S.C. §506(d). 
3. The Court enter an order voiding the April 24, 1981 judgment 
in favor of Defendants under 11 U.S.C. §362. 
R. at 718. The Trust Deed Property, the same parcels encumbered by the judgment lien 
resulting from the 1981 summary judgment, was the only security remaining upon which 
Timm could execute to collect the debt owed by Dewsnup. It is also critical to note that the 
Dewsnup's bankruptcy issue before the United States Supreme Court sought to force Timm 
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to accept Dewsnup's determined value of the property, $39,000.00, and to release the 
security interest. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773; 116 L.Ed. 903 (1992). It was 
necessary for Timm to defend against this claim to prevent its security interest from being 
significantly compromised. Therefore, all amounts expended in the bankruptcy proceedings 
were necessary to protect Timm's security interest. The trial court so found and that finding 
is supported by the substantial evidence offered at the hearing on costs and attorneys fees. 
R. at 781; Tr. 937: p. 56. 
In her Brief, Dewsnup erroneously asserts that "[o]nce all principal and interest on the 
Promissory Notes was paid in full on December 5,1980, there was no contractual basis under 
the Promissory Notes for Plaintiffs to recover any costs and attorney fees thereafter incurred 
by the Plaintiffs for any reason." Brief of Appellant at p. 23. This argument does violence 
to settled principles of contract interpretation. 
The basic purpose in interpreting a contract is to determine the intention of the parties, 
which is controlling. Winegar v. Froerner Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
Dewsnup's interpretation would completely eviscerate the value of a contract provision for 
attorneys fees. No party could ever be held responsible for the payment of such fees without 
the other party losing the benefit of its bargain. 
The Utah Court of Appeals apparently recognized this when it held that the prevailing 
party in a dispute over contractual attorneys fee provisions is entitled not only to attorneys 
31\TimmIV\Brief-2 1 9 
fees on appeal, but also to fees reasonably incurred in establishing the reasonableness of the 
fees to which it was entitled. Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d 470, 476 (Utah 
App. 1999); citing James Constructors, Inc. v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665,674 (Utah App. 
1994). Dewsnup's construction is obviously contrary to the intent of attorneys fee provisions 
and is contrary to established Utah law. 
B. The Trial Court's Findings Sufficiently Support the Trial Court's Determination 
That Timm's $88.911.67 in Costs and Fees are Recoverable, 
The trial court's award of attorneys fees must be based on the evidence below and 
supported by findings of fact. Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266,268 (Utah 1992). 
In the instant case, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing to receive the 
parties' evidence, hear any witnesses, and determine the amount of costs and fees that were 
due and owing on the date of the non-judicial sale. Prior to the hearing, and in support of the 
evidence to be presented at the hearing, Timm filed and proffered the Affidavits of Wendell 
E. Bennett and Michael Z. Hayes, legal counsel for Timm in these proceedings. R. at 702, 
706. 
At the hearing, Timm's attorneys, Michael Z. Hayes and Wendell E. Bennett, testified 
on behalf of Timm. The court also received Plaintiffs Exhibit 6, which are the actual billing 
statements of legal counsel representing Timm through the course of this and the bankruptcy 
litigation. Plaintiffs Exhibit 6 included a detailed recitation of the work performed and the 
actual time spent for each entry. R. at 937: p. 25-26; R. at 777. All of these entries relate to 
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the time spent and fees incurred to collect on the Note and protect Timm's security in the 
Trust Deed Property. 
Dewsnup did not present any evidence at the hearing and failed to object in any way 
to either the reasonableness or amount of the fees. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial 
court made findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the amount, reasonableness and 
necessity of attorneys fees and costs. Included within its findings, the court found that: 
4. From December 5, 1980, to April 29, 1994, Plaintiffs were 
required to expend Eighty-three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 
67/100 ($83,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees in an attempt to collect 
amounts due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants, and to 
protect Plaintiffs security for the payment of said notes. 
5. The Eighty-three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 
67/100 ($83,911.67) was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work 
actually performed and the expenditures and the legal work performed were 
reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter and to preserve 
Plaintiffs' interest in the property which secured payment of all sums due 
under the Promissory Notes. 
6. Of the Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 
67/100 ($88,911.67) paid by Plaintiffs between the inception of this case and 
April 29, 1994, Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and 
07/100 ($11,896.07) were taxes on the property which served as security for 
payment of the Promissory Notes. The taxes were paid to avoid a tax sale of 
the property and in order to preserve the Plaintiffs' security interest. 
7. The Court finds that between December 5,1980, and the award 
of Summary Judgment by the District Court on April 14, 1981, work was 
performed to collect sums due under the Promissory Notes and to collect sums 
due for an advance paid by Plaintiffs under an Assignment of Contract, which 
Assignment of Contract also served as security for the payment of sums due 
under the Promissory Notes. 
8. The Court finds that the attorneys fees expended for legal work 
during the time between December 5, 1980 and April 14, 1981 are not 
segregable and not allocable to separate causes of action, as pursuit of both 
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causes of action was necessary to collect amounts due under the Promissory 
Notes and to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property. 
9. The Court finds that all fees and costs were reasonable under the 
circumstances of this case. The Court further finds that Defendant's repeated 
bankruptcy filings and efforts to prevent non-judicial sales of the property 
securing payment of sums due under the Promissory Notes created significant 
cost and legal expense for the Plaintiffs. 
10. The Court finds that all costs and fees incurred in bankruptcy 
proceedings between 1981 and 1994 were necessary to preserve Plaintiffs 
security interest in the property and were incurred in an effort to recover 
amounts due for costs and attorneys fees under the Promissory Notes and Trust 
Deed. 
11. Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 506) 
authorizes Plaintiffs to recover costs and attorneys fees expended in protecting 
their security interest in the property of Defendant Aletha Dewsnup. 
12. The Trust Deed which gave Plaintiffs a security interest in 
Aletha Dewsnup's property authorizes recover of costs and attorneys fees 
expended by Plaintiffs in conducting the non-judicial sale of the property. 
R. at 781-782. 
Based upon the uncontraverted evidence submitted and the court's findings and 
conclusions, Timm's evidence was overwhelmingly sufficient to satisfy its legal burden to 
demonstrate that its attorneys fees were recoverable. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Rejected Dewsnup's Attempt to "Allocate" the Costs 
and Fees to the Arrow Contract 
In her Brief, Dewsnup argues that both the trial court and Timm failed to allocate the 
costs and attorneys fees incurred to the Arrow Contract. This argument misinterprets the 
applicable legal authority and the evidence submitted in this matter. 
Paragraph 8 of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law states: 
31\TimmIV\Bnef-2 2 2 
The Court finds that the attorneys fees expended for legal work during 
the time between December 5,1980 and April 14,1981 are not segregable and 
not allocable to separate causes of action, as pursuit of both causes of action 
was necessary to collect amounts due under the Promissory Notes and to 
preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property. 
R. at 782. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has opined that "an allocation [of fees] is sufficient if the 
substance of the process results in separating recoverable from non-recoverable fees." 
Brown v. DavidK. Richards & Co., 978 P.2d at 474 (Utah App. 1999). The evidence in this 
matter presented at the hearing on attorneys fees and costs demonstrates that this burden was 
met - only recoverable fees were submitted to the trial court. Nonrecoverable fees were not. 
According to the Affidavit of Wendell Bennett, on December 5,1980, Dewsnup paid 
only the outstanding principal and interest owed to Timm on the three Promissory Notes. R. 
at 695. At that time, the costs and attorneys fees owing from Dewsnup to Timm were 
$5,000. Id. Between December 5, 1980, and April 29,1981, the date the trial court entered 
its award of summary judgment to Timm, the costs and fees had increased to $6,985. R. at 
694. 
Within a day or two of the court's summary judgment, Dewsnup filed a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceeding. R. at 937: p. 11, Ifll 3-5. Mr. Bennett testified that, over the next 
several years, from 1981 through 1987, he tried, on different occasions, to schedule a non-
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judicial sale of the property, but each time was prevented from proceeding with the non-
judicial sale by Dewsnup's bankruptcy proceedings. R. at 937: p. 11-12. 
Mr. Bennett further testified that, from the time the trial court awarded summary 
judgment to Timm in 1981 until the time he turned the case over to Mr. Hayes to represent 
Timm, all of Bennett's efforts were expended to protect Timm's interest in the Trust Deed 
Property, which, by virtue of Dewsnup's bankruptcies, was the only security left from which 
Timm could collect the debt owed. R. at 937: p. 12, ffi[ 6-9. 
For purposes of allocating attorneys fees, Mr. Bennett's representation of Timm can 
be broken out into three distinct periods. From the beginning of Mr. Bennett's representation 
of Timm to December 5, 1980, when Dewsnup paid the principal and interest due on the 
Promissory Notes, all of Mr. Bennett's efforts were necessary to collect amounts due and 
owing under the Promissory Notes. R. at 937: p. 8,19-20. Mr. Bennett's testimony indicated 
that Timm's advance on the Arrow Contract was necessary to preserve that contract as 
security for payment of the Promissory Notes. Therefore, the Timm advance on the Arrow 
Contract was made in an effort to collect sums due under the Promissory Notes and any 
attorneys fees incurred thereby were chargeable to the Promissory,Notes as costs of 
collection. 
Between December 5, 1980, and the trial court's award of summary judgment on 
April 29, 1981, an additional $1,985 in costs and fees were incurred by Timm. Mr. Bennett 
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did testify that approximately one-fifth of his time during that period was spent to recover 
the costs and attorneys fees under the Promissory Note and four-fifths of his time was spent 
to recover the money advanced on the Arrow Contract. R. at 937: p. 21, fflj 18-25. However, 
Mr. Bennett further testified that he did not believe the fees should be "allocated" because 
all of his efforts were to protect the Trust Deed security or to collect on the Note. He viewed 
it all as one debt that had not been paid off. R. at 937: p. 19-21. 
Finally, Mr. Bennett testified that from the time of the 1981 award of summary 
judgment until he was replaced by Mr. Hayes, all of Bennett's efforts were expended in the 
bankruptcy court to protect Timm's interest in the Trust Deed Property, which then was 
Timm's only means of collecting the debt owed on the Notes. All of these costs are 
recoverable under 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) and under the unambiguous terms of the Notes. 
Timm's attorney, Michael Z. Hayes, also testified at both the September 8 and 
November 13,2000, attorneys fee hearings. He testified that he made no allocation of fees 
paid to his firm because all of his fees were recoverable.1 His firm's fees were all expended 
to protect Timm's security interest in the Trust Deed Property. R. at 937: p. 26,27. Further, 
those fees were recoverable under applicable bankruptcy law. 
1
 Mr. Hayes did not make any claims for or present evidence on the thousands of 
dollars of legal fees expended by his clients after the Trust Deed sale in 1994. R. at 937: 
p. 30. 
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From the foregoing, it is apparent that Timm allocated fees by separating recoverable 
fees from non-recoverable fees. While not specifically referred to as an "allocation" by Mr. 
Bennett and Mr. Hayes, the recoverable fees were allocated by excluding from the evidence 
all fees that were not recoverable. Dewsnup's complaint is only that the trial court did not 
allocate the fees in the way Dewsnup argued - without presenting any evidence to contradict 
Timm's evidence. 
After considering Dewsnup's argument for allocation, the trial court appropriately 
allocated between recoverable and non-recoverable fees and found that Timm's evidence as 
to the fees claimed demonstrated that all the fees claimed were recoverable. Dewsnup 
presented no evidence to the trial court to dispute Timm's evidence. 
The trial court's finding and ruling that the fees requested were not allocable should 
be affirmed. 
D. Timm is Not Estopped from Demonstrating that $88,911,67 in Costs and 
Attorneys Fees was Recoverable, 
Dewsnup argues that the amount of costs and attorneys fees owing should be limited 
to $50,530.76, relying on Timm's April 1994 interrogatory response furnished below. R. at 
425, Addendum; Appellant's Brief. However, Dewsnup seeks to mislead this Court by 
failing to quote the full text of that answer, which specifically states that "[t]his figure does 
not include attorneys fees and costs incurred after April 1,1994, nor does it include attorneys 
fees expended by Plaintiffs between April 29, 1981, and March of 1987, which is the date 
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that the Plaintiffs hired Michael Z. Hayes to represent them in this case." The trial court 
made a specific finding that $88,911.67 was the amount of costs and attorneys fees incurred 
and was due and owing under the Promissory Notes secured by the Trust Deed at the time 
of the non-judicial sale. Finding No. 6, R. at 781. Timm was not estopped from showing by 
its evidence that all of the costs and fees presented protected the Trust Deed Property or were 
to collect the Note. That total was $88,911.67. The trial court's finding is supported by the 
evidence. 
POINT II 
THE NON-JUDICIAL SALE OF DEWSNUP'S PROPERTY WAS NOT 
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Dewsnup argues that the trustee's sale was barred by the statute of limitations as to 
the entire "debt." (Brief of Appellant at p. 32). However, Dewsnup fails to acknowledge 
that her intervening bankruptcies stayed Timm's action and tolled the statute of limitations 
while escalating the attorneys fee obligation. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41 (1996), "[w]hen the commencement of an action 
is stayed by injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction 
or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action." The 
United States Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) states, in part: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition 
filed under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title, or an application filed under 
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section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as 
a stay, applicable to all entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the 
issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or 
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have 
been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, 
or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of 
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the 
case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or 
of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the 
estate . . . . 
By virtue of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-41, the statute of 
limitations for Timm to pursue any foreclosure proceedings was tolled by Dewsnup's 
bankruptcy. See City Corp. Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992). Therefore, 
as a matter of law, Dewsnup's claim on this point fails. 
Dewsnup now argues, for the first time on appeal, that Timm's 1988 Notice of Default 
indicates that Timm was not stayed, but if there was a stay then the Notice violated the stay. 
Brief of Appellant at p. 34. Dewsnup correctly notes that Timm received an abandonment 
of the Trust Deed Property from the bankruptcy trustee in 1988. Immediately after receiving 
that abandonment, Timm filed a Notice of Default on the Trust Deed Property. Dewsnup 
argues that this Notice of Default was either void as a violation of the automatic stay or that 
the abandonment of the Trust Deed Property ended the tolling of the statute of limitations. 
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In a remarkable attempt to mislead this Court, Dewsnup fails to acknowledge her 
January 1989 motion for stay pending appeal, brought by her for the specific and express 
purpose of preventing Timm from going forward with the foreclosure sale. R. at 807, 
Addendum. Obviously, the Bankruptcy Court's order granting that intervening stay pending 
appeal prevented Timm from going forward with the foreclosure sale, further tolling the 
statute of limitations until 1992. R. at 811, Addendum. Therefore, Dewsnup's arguments 
on this point fail. 
The trial court properly rejected this argument. 
POINT III 
DEWSNUP IS NOT ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HER CLAIM 
ALLEGING THAT UNSECURED DEBT WAS INCLUDED IN THE 
FORECLOSURE ACTION. 
Dewsnup argues that she is entitled to damages based on Timm's assertion that the 
1994 non-judicial sale included debt arising from the Arrow Contract advance. Dewsnup 
argues that she is entitled to any excess proceeds to be realized from the sale after payment 
to Timm of obligations arising under the Promissory Notes which were secured by the Trust 
Deed Property. Dewsnup acknowledges in this argument that Timm's attorneys fees and 
costs were part of the secured debt and that she didn't pay them. However, Dewsnup 
conveniently ignores that what was a $5,000 obligation in 1980 has escalated only because 
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of her refusal to pay and unrelenting attempts to void Timm's Trust Deed security for the 
Notes. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1 -29, Dewsnup clearly cannot recover damages based on 
her allegation that an "unsecured debt" was included in the non-judicial sale. This section 
governs the disposition of proceeds after a Trustee's sale and provides, in part: 
The Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment 
of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount 
which may be provided for the in the trust deed, second, to payment of the 
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person or 
persons legally entitled to the proceeds, or the trustee, in his discretion, may 
deposit the balance of the proceeds with the Clerk of the District Court of the 
County in which the sale took place . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
Interpreting this statutory provision, Utah appellate courts have held that after a non-
judicial sale, any excess proceeds replace the property as security, and any remaining liens 
attach to the excess proceeds. Randall v. Valley Title, 681 P.2d 219 (Utah 1984); In re 
Property in West Valley City v. Munford, 2000 Ut. 116, 1 P.3d 1116 (Utah App. 2000). 
These cases clearly indicate that, under § 57-1-29, the excess proceeds, if any, arising from 
the non-judicial sale are to be paid to junior lienholders. 
In this case, there are two distinct debts at issue: the debt on the Promissory Notes, 
secured by the Trust Deed Property; and the Arrow Contract advance, which this Court has 
determined not to be secured by the Trust Deed. 
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However, the District Court's summary judgment award of $49,966.21 to Timm for 
the advance paid on the Arrow Contract assignment was affirmed by this Court in Timm II, 
921 P.2d at 1387. That judgment, as a valid judgment against Dewsnup, attached as a lien 
to her real property, including the Trust Deed Property. The $49,966.21 judgment arising out 
of the Arrow Contract advance became a junior lien (junior to the Trust Deed) on the Trust 
Deed Property. 
Upon the non-judicial sale, Timm was entitled to the excess sale proceeds to satisfy 
their judgment lien. As noted in Dewsnup's Brief, Timm bid $ 115,000.00 at the non-judicial 
sale. The trial court has found that upon the date of the non-judicial sale, $88,911.67 was 
due and owing in Timm's costs and attorneys fees on the Promissory Notes. Any difference 
between the $115,000.00 bid for the property, and the $88,911.67 debt on the Notes cannot 
satisfy Timm's judgment lien of $49,996 for the Arrow Contract advance. Therefore, there 
are no excess proceeds to be paid to Dewsnup. Dewsnup suffered no damages arising from 
this alleged foreclosure for an "unsecured debt." There were never any excess proceeds to 
be paid over to Dewsnup because of Dewsnup's own conduct and failure to pay the entire 
debt, thereby increasing the debt. Additionally, Dewsnup agues without any authority 
whatsoever that the notice of sale should have recited the amount of debt for which the non-
judicial sale was to be held. In fact, Utah law contains no such requirement. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-25 (1953). 
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In Southeast Timberlands v. Security National, 469 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. App. 1996), the 
debtor sought to set aside a foreclosure sale. The debtor claimed that the sale should be set 
aside because the notice referenced a debt of $400,000.00 when the actual debt owed was 
only $362,000.00. The court refused to set aside the sale, noting that Georgia's foreclosure 
notice requirements did not require a listing of the amount of the debt. Therefore, a 
misstatement or overstatement of the debt did not render the advertisement legally defective 
or the sale unlawful. 
In this case, Dewsnup has made no claim or showing that inclusion of the "unsecured 
debt" chilled bidding at the sale. In fact, such a claim cannot be made as the only party, other 
than Timm, who was aware of Timm's claims was Dewsnup. 
Finally, we suggest that while this Court has determined that the Arrow Contract 
advance was not secured by the Trust Deed Property, at the time of the 1994 non-judicial 
sale, Timm acted in good faith and reliance on a valid judgment of the District Court in this 
matter. Although Dewsnup filed a motion to stay the non-judicial sale, she failed to properly 
bring that motion to the trial court's attention in a timely manner. To allow Dewsnup to 
recover damages under these circumstances would be inequitable considering Timm's good 
faith and its judgment lien. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF'S NON-JUDICIAL SALE OF DEWSNUP'S PROPERTY 
DID NOT VIOLATE THE ONE-ACTION RULE. 
Dewsnup argues that Timm's 1994 non-judicial sale violated the one-action rule 
because "where Plaintiff had a judgment for costs and attorneys fees, Plaintiff could not hold 
a non-judicial Trustee's sale on the Trust Deed Property for the same debt/5 However, Utah 
law and the one-action rule itself preclude its application to the facts of this case. 
A. The One-Action Rule Does Not Apply to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29. 
Dewsnup argues that because Timm's non-judicial sale violated the one-action rule, 
it was unlawful. However, the Utah Court of Appeals has determined that, in a case such as 
this one, the application of other relevant law determines the question. 
In Munford, 1 P.3d 1116 (Utah App. 2000), the Utah appeals court reviewed a claim 
strikingly similar to this case. The appellant, Munford, owned property secured by a trust 
deed and by another junior lien. Munford defaulted on this senior loan. The trustee of the 
senior trust deed initiated non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. At the trustee's sale, the 
junior lienholder, Alliance, purchased the property. Because the amount realized from the 
sale left a surplus after the senior lienholder's debt was satisfied, the trustee deposited the 
funds into the trial court. Alliance, as a junior lienholder, applied for a release of the funds, 
but Munford objected. Munford claimed that she was entitled to the funds and that, because 
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Alliance had failed first to exhaust it security, it was precluded by the one-action rule from 
claiming the funds. 
The Court of Appeals determined: 
We need not reach the issues of whether the one-action rule applies or 
whether Alliance is a sold-out junior lienholder, because we agree with the 
trial court that this situation is governed by section 57-1-29 and by Randall. 
* * * 
In our case, the trial court correctly concluded that Alliance was legally 
entitled to the excess proceeds. When the Property was sold at the foreclosure 
sale, the res securing Alliance's lien was converted from realty to personal 
property—specifically, the excess proceeds. It makes no difference that 
Alliance bought the Property; the sale of the Property did not extinguish 
Alliance's lien. Rather, the proceeds replaced the Property as security for 
Alliance's lien. (Cite omitted.) Accordingly, we conclude the trial court 
correctly ruled that Alliance was "legally entitled to the proceeds," Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-29 (Supp.1999), and the trial court correctly granted Alliance's 
Motion for Release of Funds. 
Munford, l?.3d at 1118-1119. 
The disposition of this matter is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-29. Simply, 
Utah's one-action rule does not apply. 
B. The Language of the One-Action Rule Precludes its Application, 
Utah's one-action rule does not preclude collateral proceedings where a debt is 
secured by both a mortgage (or trust deed) on real property and personal property. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-37-1 provides: 
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There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Dewsnup's debt on the Promissory Notes was secured by a Trust Deed, water rights 
and Dewsnup's assigned interest in the Arrow Contract. Additionally, there are two separate 
and distinct debts at issue: one on the Promissory Notes, and one arising from Timm's 
advance of the Arrow Contract payment. By the very terms of the statute itself, the one-
action rule does not apply in this case because the Notes were not secured solely by 
"mortgage on real estate." 
We also note that Dewsnup's arguments on this point are inconsistent with her 
arguments before the trial court below. R. at 919. With reference to the one-action rule, 
Dewsnup essentially argues that the entire transaction between Timm and Dewsnup 
constituted one "mortgage" on real property. However, throughout the course of this case, 
and now specifically in her argument relating to foreclosure for "unsecured debt," Dewsnup 
has successfully argued that the Arrow Contract assignment and the Trust Deed were 
completely separate and distinct transactions and that the advance on the Arrow Contract was 
not secured by the Trust Deed Property. With this in mind, Dewsnup cannot now argue that 
the entire transaction between Timm and Dewsnup constituted one "mortgage" on real 
property in order to apply the one-action rule. 
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C. Dewsnup's Bankruptcy Bars Application of the One-Action Rule, 
The one-action rule is intended to limit a creditor's means of enforcing its debt, but 
not the right to recover. City Consumer Services, Inc. v. Peters, 815 P.2d 234, 237 (Utah 
1991). Dewsnup argues that the District Court's award of summary judgment in this matter 
precludes Timm's non-judicial sale. However, where a bankruptcy eliminates a judgment 
creditor's right to collect that debt from a judgment debtor, but the debt is still secured by a 
lien on real property, the one-action rule should not act as a bar to collection of that debt 
through non-judicial sale. 
In Peters, this Court held that the one-action rule did not bar an action by a junior 
lienholder where the real property securing the debt had been lost through foreclosure sale 
by a senior lienholder. By analogy, where a party has obtained a judgment against an 
individual debtor, and bankruptcy eliminates the ability to collect that judgment, the one-
action rule should not bar collection of the debt by a non-judicial sale of property which 
secures the original debt. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the general intent of the 
law, which is to give the parties the benefit of their bargain. The contrary result argued for 
by Dewsnup would also contravene longstanding bankruptcy law which holds that while the 
personal debt may be discharged, judgment liens are not discharged through bankruptcy. 
Dewsnup v. 77mm, 112 S.Ct. at 776. 
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D. Dewsnup Waived the One-Action Rule as a Cause of Action, 
The original Complaint in this case alleged Timm's efforts to conduct a non-judicial 
sale of the Trust Deed Property beginning in 1980. Therefore, from the very outset of this 
case, Dewsnup has been aware that Timm was proceeding judicially to collect the debt 
arising from the Arrow Contract assignment and through a non-judicial sale to collect the 
debt on the Promissory Notes. Any claims or defenses relating to the one-action rule have 
been available to Dewsnup since 1980. The issue of the one-action rule raises matters 
outside of Timm's prima facie case. Therefore, under Utah law, the one-action rule was an 
affirmative defense to Timm's efforts. There is no evidence in the record that the one-action 
rule was ever timely raised as an affirmative defense to the trustee's sale or to the action. 
Failure to raise that defense results in a waiver of the right to do so. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Const Co., Inc., 682 P.2d 289 (Utah 1984). 
POINT V 
DEWSNUP HAD ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
Dewsnup has disingenuously argued that the trustee's sale should be set aside because 
she did not receive notice via certified and registered mail as the statute provides. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-26(2). Dewsnup still makes her argument despite having received actual 
notice of the sale. Her actual notice is evidenced by Dewsnup's motion to stay the sale, filed 
a month in advance of the date of the sale. R. at 171. Indeed, she was even at the sale. 
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Section 57-1-26(2) expressly requires that certified, registered mail be given only 
when a proper request for notice has been recorded or is included in the trust deed. While 
Dewsnup's Trust Deed did include a request for notice, the only address given was "Deseret, 
Utah" with no delivery address included. Such a "general delivery" address precluded 
certified or registered mail. Timm's notice of the sale, including posting the properties with 
the sale notice and the statutorily required publication, provided actual notice and 
substantially complied with the statute. 
This Court has upheld the validity of a trustee's sale despite minor defects in the 
notice of sale. Progressive Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty Services, Inc., 1A?> P.2d 1158 
(Utah 1987). The Washington appellate court has also held that defects in the notice of sale 
which do not affect a debtor's knowledge or ability to attend and participate are not grounds 
to set aside the sale. Stewart v. Good, 754 P.2d 150 (Wash. App. 1988). 
In this case, not only did Dewsnup have actual notice of the sale well in advance, but 
she has completely failed to demonstrate any prejudice to her by her failure to receive notice 
by registered or certified mail. Therefore, while there may have been some dispute as to 
whether or not notices were sent, that dispute was not material. What was material and 
undisputed was that Dewsnup had actual notice and attempted to block the sale. The trial 
court's rejection of Dewsnup's argument should be affirmed. 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO TIMM. 
On appeal, Dewsnup now argues that there are genuine issues of material fact 
preventing an award of summary judgment in this matter. However, Dewsnup failed to ever 
make this claim and argument to the trial court. This Court should not consider this 
argument. 
Even if this Court considered such an argument for the first time on appeal, it is 
apparent that there were no genuine disputes as to any material fact preventing the summary 
adjudication. 
A. This Court Should Not Consider Dewsnup's Improper Argument for the First 
Time on Appeal, 
On appeal, the Court will not consider an issue not raised in the trial court except upon 
exceptional circumstances or plain error. Coleman v. Stevens, 17 P.3d 1122 (Utah 2000); 
Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994). In this case, Dewsnup raised no 
argument of any genuine issues of material fact in the trial court. There is no showing of 
"plain error" or "exceptional circumstance" here. Her arguments on this point should not be 
considered by this Court. 
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In the trial court, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Timm's 
motion sought dismissal of Dewsnup's counterclaim. Dewsnup's motion sought partial 
summary judgment on her unlawful foreclosure claim. 
Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, governing motions for 
summary judgment, reads in pertinent part: 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities 
in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists.. . . 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and 
authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the 
party contends a genuine issue exists. . . . All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Dewsnup's memorandum in opposition to Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment did 
not set forth any facts she disputed and Dewsnup did not argue any. R. at 875. Nowhere in 
any of her briefing on the summary judgment motions does Dewsnup argue that there were 
genuine issues of material fact that prevented summary judgment. Id.; R. at 898. Moreover, 
the alleged facts argued in Dewsnup's Brief at page 46 do not appear anywhere in her 
briefing on the parties' cross summary judgment motions in the lower court. Accordingly, 
her issues should not be considered on appeal. 
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B. There Are No Genuine Disputes as to Any Material Fact Preventing an Award 
of Summary Judgment 
Dewsnup contends that in the time between the court's order of summary judgment 
in April 1981 and the non-judicial sale in April 1994 (and during her several pending 
bankruptcies), she made several tenders of payment to Timm sufficient to have the Trust 
Deed released. Dewsnup argues that this fact should have prevented the trial court from 
granting Timm's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A tender requires that there be a bona fide, unconditional offer of payment of the 
amount of money due, coupled with an actual production of the money or its equivalent. 
Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319,1322 (Utah 1975). Even if this Court were to 
consider Dewsnup's alleged tenders in a light most favorable to her, it is clear that no valid, 
legal tender was ever made. 
In her Brief (at page 46), Dewsnup suggests that she made separate "tenders" of 
$40,000.00 and $ 10,000.00 to Timm. The only evidence of the first alleged "tender" consists 
of a third-party letter to Dewsnup indicating that a loan may yet be approved on the property 
subject to further qualification. R. at 433. Evidence of the second alleged tender is another 
letter, unsigned, to Dewsnup indicating that a loan may be approved, conditioned on 
Dewsnup providing necessary security. R. at 432. A copy of each letter is included in the 
Addendum to this Brief. The third alleged tender was a supersedeas bond filed in the Federal 
District Court to cover Timm's appeal costs incurred in her bankruptcy appeals. R. at 431. 
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None of these factual allegations amount to evidence of a valid, legal tender of the costs and 
attorneys fees owing to Timm. Moreover, at the time the supposed tenders were made, 
Dewsnup was in bankruptcy. 
Dewsnup fails to acknowledge to this Court that the trial court in this matter has 
already considered these matters and previously made specific findings regarding her 
allegation before Timm III. In the trial court's summary judgment on February 18,1998,2 the 
court determined that: 
(1) Based on the evidence presented to this Court, and the legal 
arguments raised in Plaintiffs' Memoranda, there is no genuine dispute of 
material fact with regard to Plaintiffs' contention that Defendants failed to pay 
the costs and attorneys fees under the Note secured by the Trust Deed . . . 
either prior to or after the principal and interest was paid on the notes and there 
is no competent evidence before the Court to show that any valid tender of 
payment of the costs and attorneys fees was ever made, 
R. at 613 (emphasis added). 
Finally, any evidence of a tender would be irrelevant to whether or not Timm had a 
duty to reconvey the Trust Deed. The trial court made specific findings, supported by the 
evidence, that $88,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees were due and owing on the date of the 
2
 Timm acknowledges that this summary judgment was reversed in part and 
remanded. However, the remand was only "to address the merits of Dewsnup's claim for 
the wrongful foreclosure of the trust deed property and other claims and defenses alleged 
in the counterclaim." Timm III, 990 P.2d at 945. Dewsnup's failure to reargue these 
tenders in the trial court and her reliance on the same defective evidence, leads to the 
same result. 
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non-judicial sale. Dewsnup has completely failed to demonstrate that at any point any 
alleged tender would have been sufficient to satisfy the costs and attorneys fees owed. 
Accordingly, Dewsnup has failed to demonstrate that there were any genuine issues of 
material fact preventing an award of summary judgment to Timm. 
CONCLUSION 
Timm requests that this Court affirm the decision of the trial court on the following 
bases: 
1. The trial court's determination that $88,911.67 in costs and attorneys fees was 
recoverable was correct and was supported by substantial evidence. The testimony of the 
witnesses and the proffered affidavits and exhibits demonstrated that the fees were necessary 
and reasonably incurred. Further, the evidence demonstrated that Timm's allocation was 
sufficient in that only recoverable fees were submitted. 
2. The trial court's decision on the summary judgment motions was correct 
because the sale of the Trust Deed Property was accomplished within the statute of 
limitations; Dewsnup is not entitled to relief on her claim that the sale included unsecured 
debt; the one-action rule is not applicable to the facts of this case; Dewsnup had actual notice 
of the sale; and there were no genuine issues of material fact preventing an award of 
summary judgment to Timm. 
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Based on the foregoing, Timm requests that this Court award Timm its costs and fees 
incurred in defending this appeal. 
DATED this /jf day ofSfeefr, 2002. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
To<$3j. GO 
Attorneys for PMiritrrfTAppelTee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this /#f day of-Mafeh-, 2002,1 caused to be mailed, first-class 
United States mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
Crippen & Cline 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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ADDENDUM 
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UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY 
CHAPTER 1-GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Copr. © West Group 2002. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 107-89, approved 12-18-01 
$ 108. Extension of time 
(a) If applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a 
period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period has not expired before the date of the 
filing of the petition, the trustee may commence such action only before the later of— 
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the 
case; or 
(2) two years after the order for relief. 
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a 
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual protected under 
section 1201 or 1301 of this title may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss, cure a default, or 
perform any other similar act, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee 
may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the 
case; or 
(2) 60 days after the order for relief. 
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a 
nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court 
other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to which such 
individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title, and such period has not expired before the date of the 
filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of— 
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the 
case; or 
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this 
title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim. 
CREDIT(S) 
1993 Main Volume 
(Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2556; Pub.L. 98-353, Title 111. $ 424, July 10, 1984, 98 Stat. 369; Pub.L. 
99-554. Title IKS 257(b), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3114.) 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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F> 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY 
CHAPTER 3--CASE ADMINISTRATION 
SUBCHAPTER IV-ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS 
Copr. © West Group 2002. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 107-89, approved 12-18-01 
$ 362. Automatic stay 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or 
an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of~ 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, 
administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the 
commencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over 
property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a 
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case 
under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title 
against any claim against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of an application under section 5(a)(3) of 
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, does not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding 
against the debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section-
(A) of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding for— 
(i) the establishment of paternity; or 
(ii) the establishment or modification of an order for alimony, maintenance, or support; or 
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(B) of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate; 
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect, or to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest 
in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of 
this title or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this 
title; 
(4) under paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (6) of subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an 
action or proceeding by a governmental unit or any organization exercising authority under the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, 
opened for signature on January 13, 1993, to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police and 
regulatory power, including the enforcement of a judgment other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or 
proceeding by the governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's or organization's police or regulatory 
power; 
|(5) Repealed. Pub.L. 105-277, Div. I, Title VI, § 603(1), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-886] 
(6) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a commodity broker, forward contract merchant, 
stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities clearing agency of any mutual debt and claim under or in connection 
with commodity contracts, as defined in section 761 of this title, forward contracts, or securities contracts, as defined 
in section 741 of this title, that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin payment, as defined 
in section 101, 741, or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 101 or 741 of this title, arising 
out of commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities contracts against cash, securities, or other property held 
by or due from such commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities 
clearing agency to margin, guarantee, secure, or settle commodity contracts, forward contracts, or securities 
contracts; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a repo participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or in 
connection with repurchase agreements that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for a margin 
payment, as defined in section 741 or 761 of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in section 741 of this title, 
arising out of repurchase agreements against cash, securities, or other property held by or due from such repo 
participant to margin, guarantee, secure or settle repurchase agreements; 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban 
Development to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by the 
Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing Act and covers property, or combinations 
of property, consisting of five or more living units; 
(9) under subsection (a), of~ 
(A) an audit by a governmental unit to determine tax liability; 
(B) the issuance to the debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency; 
(C) a demand for tax returns; or 
(D) the making of an assessment for any tax and issuance of a notice and demand for payment of such an 
assessment (but any tax lien that would otherwise attach to property of the estate by reason of such an assessment 
shall not take effect unless such tax is a debt of the debtor that will not be discharged in the case and such property 
or its proceeds are transferred out of the estate to, or otherwise revested in, the debtor). 
(10) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act by a lessor to the debtor under a lease of nonresidential real 
property that has terminated by the expiration of the stated term of the lease before the commencement of or during 
a case under this title to obtain possession of such property; 
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(11) under subsection (a) of this section, of the presentment of a negotiable instrument and the giving of notice of 
and protesting dishonor of such an instrument; 
(12) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the 
commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor 
subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which was brought by the Secretary of 
Transportation under section 31325 of title 46 (including distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a 
preferred ship or fleet mortgage, or a security interest in or relating to a vessel or vessel under construction, held by 
the Secretary of Transportation under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936, or under applicable 
State law; 
(13) under subsection (a) of this section, after the date which is 90 days after the filing of such petition, of the 
commencement or continuation, and conclusion to the entry of final judgment, of an action which involves a debtor 
subject to reorganization pursuant to chapter 11 of this title and which was brought by the Secretary of Commerce 
under section 31325 of title 46 (including distribution of any proceeds of sale) to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet 
mortgage in a vessel or a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in a fishing facility held by the Secretary 
of Commerce under section 207 or title XI of the Merchant Marine Act, 1936; 
(14) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by an accrediting agency regarding the accreditation status 
of the debtor as an educational institution; 
(15) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a State licensing body regarding the licensure of the 
debtor as an educational institution; 
(16) under subsection (a) of this section, of any action by a guaranty agency, as defined in section 435(j) of the 
Higher Education Act of 1965 or the Secretary of Education regarding the eligibility of the debtor to participate in 
programs authorized under such Act; 
(17) under subsection (a) of this section, of the setoff by a swap participant, of any mutual debt and claim under or 
in connection with any swap agreement that constitutes the setoff of a claim against the debtor for any payment due 
from the debtor under or in connection with any swap agreement against any payment due to the debtor from the 
swap participant under or in connection with any swap agreement or against cash, securities, or other property of the 
debtor held by or due from such swap participant to guarantee, secure or settle any swap agreement; or 
(18) under subsection (a) of the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax imposed by 
the District of Columbia, or a political subdivision of a State, if such tax comes due after the filing of the petition. 
The provisions of paragraphs (12) and (13) of this subsection shall apply with respect to any such petition filed on or 
before December 31, 1989. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section-
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this section continues until such property 
is no longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues until the earliest of-
(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; or 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, 12, or 
13 of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied. 
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided 
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under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest; 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this section, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization; or 
(3) with respect to a stay of an act against single asset real estate under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is 
secured by an interest in such real estate, unless, not later than the date that is 90 days after the entry of the order for 
relief (or such later date as the court may determine for cause by order entered within that 90-day period)--
(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed within a 
reasonable time; or 
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments to each creditor whose claim is secured by such real estate 
(other than a claim secured by a judgment lien or by an unmatured statutory lien), which payments are in an amount 
equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the value of the creditor's interest in the real estate. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from the stay of any act against property 
of the estate under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making 
such request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion 
of, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this 
subsection may be a preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this 
section. The court shall order such stay continued in effect pending the conclusion of the final hearing under 
subsection (d) of this section if there is a reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will 
prevail at the conclusion of such final hearing. If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing, then 
such final hearing shall be concluded not later than thirty days after the conclusion of such preliminary hearing, 
unless the 30-day period is extended with the consent of the parties in interest or for a specific time which the court 
finds is required by compelling circumstances. 
(f) Upon request of a party in interest, the court, with or without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay 
provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity 
in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing under 
subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from the stay of any act under 
subsection (a) of this section-
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues. 
(h) An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, 
including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 
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f> 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 11. BANKRUPTCY 
CHAPTER 5--CREDITORS, THE DEBTOR, AND THE ESTATE 
SUBCHAPTER I--CREDITORS AND CLAIMS 
Copr. © West Group 2002. No claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Current through P.L. 107-89, approved 12-18-01 
§ 506. Determination of secured status 
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has an interest, or that is subject 
to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the 
estate's interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be, and is an 
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than 
the amount of such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the 
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a 
plan affecting such creditor's interest. 
(b) To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of which, after any recovery under 
subsection (c) of this section, is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such 
claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or charges provided for under the agreement under 
which such claim arose. 
(c) The trustee may recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and 
expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim. 
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void, 
unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or 
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim 
under section 501 of this title. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Copyright ® 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.-one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2001 First Special Session) 
57-1-26 Requests for copies of notice of default and notice of sale -- Mailing by 
trustee or beneficiary --Publication of notice of default. 
(1) (a) Any person desiring a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of 
sale under any trust deed shall, at any time subsequent to the filing for record of 
the trust deed and prior to the filing for record of a notice of default of the 
trust deed, file for record in the office of the county recorder of any county in 
which the trust property, or any part of the trust property, is situated, a duly 
acknowledged request for a copy of any notice of default and notice of sale. Except 
as provided in Subsection (3), the request may not be included in any other 
recorded instrument. The request shall set forth the name and address of the 
persons requesting copies of those notices and shall identify the trust deed by 
stating the names of the original parties to the trust deed, the date of filing for 
record of the trust deed, the book and page where the trust deed is recorded or the 
recorder's entry number, and the legal description of the trust property. The 
request shall be in substantially the following form: 
REQUEST FOR NOTICE 
The undersigned requests that a copy of any notice of default and a copy of 
notice of sale under the trust deed filed for record (month/day/year), 
and recorded in Book , Page , Records of County, (or 
filed for record (month/day/year), with recorder's entry number 
, County) , Utah, executed by and as 
trustors, in which is named as beneficiary and as trustee, be 
mailed to (insert name) at (insert address) 
(Insert legal description) 
Signature 
(Certificate of Acknowledgement) 
(b) Upon filing for record of a request for notice, the recorder shall index 
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the request in the mortgagor's index, mortgagee's index, and abstract record. 
Except as provided in Subsection (3), the trustee under any deed of trust is not 
required to send notice of default or notice of sale to any person not filing a 
request for notice as described in Subsection (1)(a). 
(2) Not later than ten days after recordation of a notice of default, the trustee 
or beneficiary shall mail, by certified or registered mail, with postage prepaid, a 
copy of the notice of default with the recording date shown, addressed to each 
person whose name and address are set forth in a request that has been recorded 
prior to the filing for record of the notice of default, directed to the address 
designated in the request. At least 2 0 days before the date of sale, the trustee 
shall mail, by certified or registered mail, return receipt requested with postage 
prepaid, a copy of the notice of the time and place of sale, addressed to each 
person whose name and address are set forth in a request that has been recorded 
prior to the filing for record of the notice of default, directed to the address 
designated in the request. 
(3) Any trust deed may contain a request that a copy of any notice of default and 
a copy of any notice of sale under the trust deed be mailed to any person who is a 
party to the trust deed at the address of the person set forth in the trust deed. A 
copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to any 
person requesting the notice who is a party to the trust deed at the same time and 
in the same manner required in Subsection (2) as though a separate request had been 
filed by each person as provided in Subsection (1)(a). 
(4) If no address of the trustor is set forth in the trust deed and if no request 
for notice by the trustor has been recorded as provided in this section, a copy of 
the notice of default shall, no later than 15 days after the filing for record of 
the notice of default, either be: 
(a) mailed to the address of the property described in the notice of default; 
or 
(b) posted on the property. 
(5) No request for a copy of any notice filed for record under Subsections (1) 
and (3), nor any statement or allegation in any of those requests, nor any record 
of those requests, shall affect the title to trust property or be considered notice 
to any person that any person requesting copies of notice of default or of notice 
of sale has or claims any right, title or interest in, or lien or claim upon, the 
trust property. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 8; 1980, ch. 57, § 1; 1981, ch. 100, § 3; 1989, ch. 
88, § 4/ 2000, ch. 75, § 25; 2001, ch. 236, § 8. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, updated the date 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 57. REAL ESTATE 
CHAPTER 1. CONVEYANCES 
Copyright ® 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2001 First Special Session) 
57-1-29 Proceeds of trustee's sale --Disposition. 
(1) The trustee shall apply the proceeds of the trustee's sale, first, to the 
costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the 
payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the 
amount which may be provided for in the trust deed, second, to payment of the 
obligation secured by the trust deed, and the balance, if any, to the person or 
persons legally entitled to the proceeds, or the trustee, in the trustee's 
discretion, may deposit the balance of the proceeds with the clerk of the district 
court of the county in which the sale took place. If the proceeds are deposited 
with the clerk of the district court, the trustee shall file an affidavit with the 
clerk setting forth the facts of the deposit and a list of all known claimants, 
including known addresses. Upon depositing the balance and filing the affidavit, 
the trustee shall be discharged from all further responsibility and the clerk shall 
deposit the proceeds with the state treasurer subject to the order of the district 
court. 
(2) The clerk shall give notice of the deposited funds to all claimants listed in 
the trustee's affidavits within 15 days of receiving the affidavit of deposit from 
the trustee. 
(3) Any claimant may file a petition for adjudication of priority to the funds. 
The petitioner requesting the funds shall give notice of the petition to all 
claimants listed in the trustee's affidavit and to any other claimants known to the 
petitioner. The petitioner's notice must specify that all claimants have 20 days to 
contest the petition by affidavit or counter- petition. If no affidavit or counter-
petition is filed within 20 days, the court shall, without a hearing, enter an 
order directing the clerk of the court or the county treasurer to disburse the 
funds to the petitioner according to the petition. 
(4) If a petition for adjudication is contested by affidavit or counter-
petition, the district court shall, within 20 days, conduct a hearing to establish 
the priorities of the parties to the deposited funds and give notice to all known 
claimants of the date and time of the hearing. At the hearing, the court will 
establish the priorities of the parties to the deposited funds and enter an order 
directing the clerk of the court or county treasurer to disburse the funds 
according to the court's determination. 
(5) All persons having or claiming to have an interest in the disposition of 
funds deposited with the court under Subsection (1) who fail to appear and assert 
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their claims are barred from any claim to the funds after the entry of the court's 
order under Subsection (4). 
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 11; 1997, ch. 215, § 7; 2001, ch. 236, § 11. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, deleted "county" 
before "clerk" and inserted "district court of the" near the end of the first 
sentence; substituted "state" for "county" in the second, sentence; and made 
stylistic changes throughout. 
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added the sentence beginning "If 
the proceeds are deposited" and the phrase "and filing the affidavit" in Subsection 
(1), added Subsections (2) through (5), and made a stylistic change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Application. 
Because the construction agreement between the parties did not provide for 
payment to defendant before plaintiffs in the event of foreclosure, the surplus 
proceeds of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale belonged to plantiffs where plaintiffs 
held second priority interest by virtue of their trust deed before foreclosure and 
that interest survived foreclosure. Jones v. ERA Brokers Consol., 2000 UT 61, 6, 
P.3d 1129. 
Duties of trustee. 
A trustee under trust deed has an affirmative duty to uphold his statutory 
responsibilities, and may not ignore those responsibilities in order to assist 
certain interest holders at the expense of others. Randall v. Valley Title, 681 
P.2d 219 (Utah 1984) . 
Excess proceeds. 
Junior lienholder was legally entitled to the excess proceeds under this section, 
because when the property was sold at the foreclosure sale, the res securing junior 
lienholder's lien was converted from realty to personal property. It made no 
difference that the junior lienholder bought the property; the sale of the property 
did not extinguish the lien; rather, the proceeds replaced the property as security 
for the junior lienholder"s lien. 2793 S. 3095 W. v. Munford, 2000 UT App 116, 1 
P.3d 1116. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART II. Actions, Venue, Limitation of Actions 
CHAPTER 12. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 
ARTICLE 3. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
Copyright ® 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2001 First Special Session) 
78-12-41 Effect of injunction or prohibition. 
When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory 
prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not 
part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-12-41. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Cross-References. --Injunctions, Rule 6 5A, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Bankruptcy proceeding. 
Tolling. 
Cited. 
Bankruptcy proceeding. 
The limitation period for a deficiency action that arose during the pendency of a 
bankruptcy proceeding was the three-month period provided under § 57-1- 32 and 
began running when the bankruptcy proceeding was terminated. Citicorp Mtg., Inc. v. 
Hardy, 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992). 
Tolling. 
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UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE 
PART IV. Particular Proceedings 
CHAPTER 37. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
Copyright ® 1953-2001 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. one of the LEXIS 
Publishing companies. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2001 Supplement (2001 First Special Session) 
78-37-1 Form of action --Judgment --Special execution. 
There can be but one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of 
any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter. Judgment shall be given adjudging 
the amount due, with costs and disbursements, and the sale of mortgaged property, 
or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount and accruing costs, and directing the 
sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of law relating to 
sales on execution, and a special execution or order of sale shall be issued for 
that purpose. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Supp., 104-37-1; L. 1965, ch. 172, § 1. 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Cross-References. --Execution and proceedings supplemental thereto, Rule 69, 
U.R.C.P. 
Procedure for foreclosure of service member in military service or dependent, £ 
39-7-115. 
Trust deeds, § 57-1-19 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action for deficiency. 
Additional security. 
Applicability of section. 
Defenses. 
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*1053 Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 
WEST'S UTAH RULES OF COURT 
UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
RULES OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 4. OPERATION OF THE 
COURTS 
ARTICLE 5. CIVIL PRACTICE 
Current with amendments received through 
9-1-2001. 
RULE 4-501. MOTIONS 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for filing 
motions, supporting memoranda and documents 
with the court. 
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting 
and scheduling hearings on dispositive motions. 
To establish a procedure for expedited 
dispositions. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all 
trial courts of record except proceedings before 
the court commissioners and small claims cases. 
This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Filing and service of motions and 
memoranda. 
(A) Motion and supporting memoranda. All 
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte 
matters, shall be accompanied by a 
memorandum of points and authorities 
appropriate affidavits, and copies of or 
citations by page number to relevant portions 
of depositions, exhibits or other documents 
relied upon in support of the motion. 
Memoranda supporting or opposing a motion 
shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive 
of the "statement of material facts" as provided 
in paragraph (2), except as waived by order of 
the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-
parte application is made to file an over-length 
memorandum, the application shall state the 
length of the principal memorandum, and if the 
memorandum is in excess of ten pages, the 
application shall include a summary of the 
memorandum, not to exceed five pages. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to motion. 
The responding party shall file and serve upon 
all parties within ten days after service of a 
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the 
motion, and all supporting documentation. If 
the responding party fails to file a 
memorandum in opposition to the motion 
within ten days after service of the motion, the 
moving party may notify the clerk to submit 
the matter to the court for decision as provided 
in paragraph (1)((D) of this rule. 
*1054 (C) Reply memorandum. The moving 
party may serve and file a reply memorandum 
within five days after service of the responding 
party's memorandum. 
(D) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the 
expiration of the five-day period to file a reply 
memorandum, either party may notify the clerk 
to submit the matter to the court for decision. 
The notification shall be in the form of a 
separate written pleading and captioned 
"Notice to Submit for Decision." The Notice to 
Submit for Decision shall state the date on 
which the motion was served, the date the 
memorandum in opposition, if any, was served, 
the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been 
requested. The notification shall contain a 
certificate of mailing to all parties. If neither 
party files a notice, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
(2) Motions for summary judgment. 
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(A) Memorandum in support of a motion. 
The points and authorities in support of a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a concise statement of 
material facts as to which movant contends no 
genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated 
in separate numbered sentences and shall 
specifically refer to those portions of the record 
upon which the movant relies. 
(B) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. 
The points and authorities in opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment shall begin with 
a section that contains a verbatim restatement 
of each of the movant's statement of facts as to 
which the party contends a genuine issue exists 
followed by a concise statement of material 
facts which support the party's contention. 
Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate 
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer 
to those portions of the record upon which the 
opposing party relies. All material facts set 
forth in the movant's statement and properly 
supported by an accurate reference to the 
record shall be deemed admitted for the 
purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing 
party's statement. 
(3) Hearings. 
(A) A decision on a motion shall be rendered 
without a hearing unless ordered by the court, 
or requested by the parties as provided in 
paragraphs (3)(B) or (4) below. 
(B) In cases where the granting of a motion 
would dispose of the action or any claim in the 
action on the merits with prejudice, either party 
at the time of filing the principal memorandum 
in support of or in opposition to a motion may 
file a written request for a hearing. 
*1055 (C) Such request shall be granted 
unless the court finds that (a) the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) that 
the dispositive issue or set of issues governing 
the granting or denial of the motion has been 
authoritatively decided. 
(D) When a request for hearing is denied, the 
court shall notify the requesting party. When a 
request for hearing is granted, the court shall 
set the matter for hearing or notify the 
requesting party that the matter shall be heard 
and the requesting party shall schedule the 
matter for hearing and notify all parties of the 
date and time. 
(E) In those cases where a hearing is granted, 
a courtesy copy of the motion, memorandum of 
points and authorities and all documents 
supporting or opposing the motion shall be 
delivered to the judge hearing the matter at 
least two working days before the date set for 
hearing. Copies shall be clearly marked as 
courtesy copies and indicate the date and time 
of the hearing. Courtesy copies shall not be 
filed with the clerk of the court. 
(F) If no written request for a hearing is 
made at the time the parties file their principal 
memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be 
deemed waived. 
(G) All dispositive motions shall be heard at 
least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial 
date. No dispositive motions shall be heard 
after that date without leave of the court. 
(H) If a hearing has been requested and the 
non-moving party fails to file a memorandum 
in opposition, the moving party may withdraw 
the request or the court on its own motion may 
strike the request and decide the motion 
without oral argument. 
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and 
notice and for good cause shown, the court may 
grant a request for an expedited disposition in 
any case where time is of the essence and 
compliance with the provisions of this rule 
would be impracticable or where the motion 
does not raise significant legal issues and could 
be resolved summarily. 
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own 
motion or at a party's request may direct 
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arguments of any motion by telephone 
conference without court appearance. A 
verbatim record shall be made of all telephone 
arguments and the rulings thereon if requested 
by counsel. 
[Amended effective November 1, 1996; 
November 1, 1998; April 1, 1999; April 1, 
2001; November 1,2001.] 
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he makers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and demand; and waive notice of protest, demand and of 
lor and non-payment of this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, may be extended from 
o time without in any way effecting the liability of the makers and endorsers thereof. 
his note and the interest thereon is secured by a first WCWfcSgSQfi* T r u s t D e e d d a t e d J u n e 1 , 1 9 7 8 , 
xing r e a l property in Millard County, Utah. 
I . LaMar Dewsprtip 
e t h a uew^nup ' 
— M O R T G A G E N O T E —KELLY CO . 33 W NINTH SOUTH. S L.C.. UTAH 
56,. 000.. 00— p**..h 19.?.?.. 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promise(s) to pay to A b c . 9 . . J . ? ^ 
rder, . . . \ r r ~ " ™ " ? . ^ (rrA§^9.P.Q*.9.Q.T..), 
ther with interest from date at the rate of.elf iht .6W.per cent, (. .7.1.9.7..... # ) per annum on the unpaid balance payable as 
ws, viz: 
All accrued interest shall be paid on Junel, 1979; the entire 
balance of interest and principal shall be paid on or before June 1, 
1980, provided, however, that no payment shall be permitted prior 
to June 1, 1979 
awful money of the United States of America, negotiable and payable at the office of. . . 4 i P . . N e w h ^ 
L?..M^?. Q&X*. Vtffo'.-MIQ 
lout defalcation or discount. All payments hereinabove provided for shall be applied first on accrued interest and balance to 
iction of principal. Any installments of principal and interest not paid when due shall, at the option of the legal holder 
aof, hear interest thereafter at the rate of ""4-0/»7 p e r a n n u m until paid. 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional 
I the legal holder of this note to doclare the entire principal sum hereof due and payable; and proceedings may at once be 
ituted for the recovery of the same by law, with accrued interest and costs, including reasonable attorney's fees. 
The makers and endorsers severally waive presentment, protest and demand; and waive notice of protest, demand and of 
lonor and non-payment of this note, and expressly agree that this note, or any payment thereunder, may be extended from 
E? to time without in any way effecting the liability of the makers and endorsers thereof. 
This note and the interest thereon is secured by a first XKi*CfcH#KXiK T r u s t D e e d d a t e d J u n e 1 , 1 9 7 8 , 
vering real property in Millard County, Utah. 
&£S££zc*> J^u^^^t^^^. 
AlethaODe 
T. LaMar T)ewsnup 
Dewsnup ' 
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Amended Trust Deed 
Ht>.'S.aIt..I.akft...CitX4....«feah..MUJ. 
T 
.„?...!!?...„.?. Space Above This Line For Recorder's Use 
A M E N D E D 
TRUST DEED 
With Assignment of Rents 
THIS TRUST DEED, made this l*t day of „ . . . .Me , 19...7.8 
between ...?.-.Jk5i^.«^^^ 
, as TRUSTOR, 
whose address is P M S S ? . STM 
(Stmt and numbtr) (City) (State) 
EA^.#JAY.JPECK § as TRUSTEE,' and 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE & ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT SHARING TRUST, 
ABe<^-INSURftNGE--AGENG¥T-"IN^ 
the Annette Jacob Trust 
« , as BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in ...Mii.iftE.3 
County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL ONE: See Exhibit 'A1 hereto 
PARCEL TWO: See Exhibit 'B1 hereto 
£5QQS 
Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enioyed with said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced bv » r>ro-
missory notesof even date herewith, in the principal sum of $..3..3.A.Q.Q.Qi....$56./..0Q0...i rnade 'by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the times, in the manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein confined; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the paymjnt of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provi ded. 
"NOTE: Trustee mutt be a member of the Utah State Bar; a bank, building and loan association or savings 
and loan association authorised to do such business in Utah; a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or .abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
1. To keep taid property*in good condition and repair; not to remove or "demolish any building thereon, to 
SDmplete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, aroaged or destroyed thereon; to comply with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said property; not 
to .-ommit or permit waste thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon said property in violation of la*rto 
do all othor acts which from the character or use of si id property may be reasonably necessary, the specific 
enumerations herein not excluding the general; and, if the ioan secured hereby or any part thereof is being •:&-
taine-' for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees: 
(a) To commence construction promptly and to pursue samewlth reasonable diligence to completion 
in accordance with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) To allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at all times during construction. 
Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, setting forth facta showing a default 
by Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized to accept as true and conclusive all facts and state-
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder. 
2. To provide and maintain insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on 
tho improvements now existing or hereafter erected or placed on said property.. Such insurance shall be earned 
in companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payment for such loss directly to Beneficiary 
instead of to Trustor and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, at its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of 
tho property damaged. 
3. To deliver to, pay for and maintain with Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured'hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4. To appear In and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or'Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to 
also appear in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi-
dence of title and attorney's fees In a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee. 
6. To pay at least 10 days before delinquency all taxes and assessments affecting said property, including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or 
used in connection with said property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest, 
on said property or any part thereof, which at any time appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, 
foes, and expenses of this Trust 
6. Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary, or 
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing 
Trustor from any obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner and to such extent as either may 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorised to enter upon said 
property for such purposes; commence, appear in and defend any action or-proceeding purporting to affect the 
security hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest or compromise any 
incumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgment of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost o*f evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable lees. 
7. To pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent (109fc) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby. 
IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT: 
8. Should said property or any part thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any other manner, Beneficiary shall be 
entitled to all compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its option 
to commence, appear in and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said property, 
are hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. Trustor agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensation, award, damages, and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require. 
9. At any time and from time to time upon writtten request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre-
sentation of this Trust Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
retention), without affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
Trustee may (a) consent to the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting any ease-
ment or creating any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvey, without warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as "the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof. Trustor agrees to pay reasonable Trustees 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph. 
10. As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by this Trust Deed and of any personal property 
located thereon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
form once of any agreement hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior to default as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid. 
Trustor's right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right with or without 
taking possession of the property affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Failure or 
discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right power, and authority to collect the same. 
Nothing contained herein, nor the exercise ot the right by Beneficiary to collect «hall be, or be construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under, nor a 
subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in 
person, by agent or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operation and collection, including reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may determine. 
12. The entering upon and taking possession of said property, the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or 
damage of said property, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default hereunder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice. 
13. The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other 
or subsequent default 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured here-
by or In the performance of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the obligations 
hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some part or 
parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents evidencing 
expenditures secured hereby. 
dfrect the order in which such property, u consi5unB ui »c->i.«. *..„„.. .— v #. 
auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United State* at the time of 
sale. The person conducting the sale may, for any cau*e he deems expedient, tx>nt|x>ne the sale from time to 
time until it shall be completed and, in every case, notice of |x>stponemcnt shall be given by public declaration 
thereof by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is |xtst|Kmcd 
for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sate, notice thereof shall be given in the 
same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed con-
veying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The recitals in the 
Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including Bene-
ficiary, may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) the costs and 
expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's 
fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at \0r* per annum from date 
of expenditure; (4) all other sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons 
legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County 
Clerk of the county in which the sale took place. 
16. Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shatl have the option to declare all sums 
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceed-
ing all costs and expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable 'attorney's fee in such amount as shall be 
fixed by the court. 
17. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County 
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From 
the time the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority 
and title of the trustee named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law. 
18. This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of. and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees, 
devisees, adminstrators, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder arc joint and 
several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured 
hereby. In this Trust Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or 
neuter, and the singular number includes the plural. 
19. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made a public 
record a» provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of pending sale under any other 
Trust Deed or of any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless 
brought by Trustee. 
20. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah 
21. The undersigned Trustor requests that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice of sale 
hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
Signature of Trustor A
 y signature oi Trustor 
^2<&z>£^ 
(If Trustor an Individual) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF , ss- , o 
On the / . day of L^?yr<rrr^. ^ , A.I^ 19i&£.., personally 
appeared before m e v ^ C ^ ' ^ f e ^ , 
the signer(s) of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that .#r!ne^execut$fi .the 
same. A J J/ •VV'.- -...*, 
Nolary Public residing at: ^ ' «t .<• 
My Commission Expires: £z??/ 0 s*//-^1**?* '^••% **' ' & 
(If Trustor a Corporation) '*%<? >S J \ \ ^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF 
On the day of , A.D. 19 , personally 
appeared before me , who being by me duly sworn, 
says that he is the of _ 
the corporation that executed the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its by-laws (or by authority of a resolution 
of its board of directors) and said acknowledged 
to me that said corporation executed the same. 
Notary Public residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
(To bo used only when indebtedness secured hereby has been paid in full) 
TO: TRUSTEE. 
The undersigned is the legal owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured 
by the within Trust Deed. Said note, together with all other indebtedness secured by said Trust 
Deed has been fully paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and directed, on payment 
to you of any sums owing to you under the terms of said Trust Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said Trust Deed delivered to you 
herewith, together with the said Trust Deed, and to reconvey, without warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said Trust Deed, all the estate now held by you thereunder. 
Dated. , 19.. 
Mail reconveyance to 
i 
a 
1*4 
1 
3 
a 
Q 
25008 
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Southeast Corner of the 
Southwest 1/4 of Section 4, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence North 1320 feet; 
thence West 1264 feet; thence South 625 feet; thence 
Southeasterly along the roadway 541 feet; thence South 
470 feet; thence East 840 feet to beginning. More or 
less 35 Acres 
BEGINNING 980 feet West of the Northeast Corner of the 
Northwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 17 South, Range 4 
West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; thence South 1320 feet; 
thence West 840 feet; thence North 1320 feet; thence East 
840 feet to beginning. More or less 25 Acres. 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
25008 
The Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter; of the 
Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the South-
east quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the North-
east quarter of the Southwest quarter of Section 13, 
Township 18 South, Range 8 West, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
EXCEPTIN THEREFROM that portion which lies within the 
boundaries of the DELTA CANAL COMPANY, MELVILLE 
IRRIGATION COMPANY, ABRAHAM IRRIGATION COMPANY and 
the DESERET IRRIGATION COMPANY distribution systems. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM all rights of way, stock trails, 
ditches and canals, gravel pits and gravel beds. 
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EXHIBIT 'B' 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to Attorney's Fees and Costs 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
lzfe/( Michael Z.Hayes (#1432) Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801) 272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oo itoA 
.Deputy 
-oooOooo— 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND 
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT 
SHARING TRUST; ABCO 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah 
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT 
CO., a limited partnership, THE 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF 
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE, 
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L. 
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as 
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM, 
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a 
Professional Corporation; MINERAL 
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY 
V.KAPS, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
Civil No. 7191 
Judge Fred D. Howard 
-oooOooo— 779 
This matter came before the Court for hearing initially on September 8,2000, at 9:00 a.m., 
and was concluded on November 13, 2000, the Honorable Fred D. Howard presiding. Plaintiffs 
were represented by Michael Z. Hayes and Todd J. Godfrey. Defendant, Aletha Dewsnup, was 
represented by Russell A. Cline. The Court took evidence presented by Plaintiffs and also heard 
argument from the parties. The hearing was called for the purpose of determining the amount of 
costs and attorneys fees owing at the time the sale of the property at issue in this matter was 
conducted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court, having considered all the evidence submitted and the arguments of the parties, 
and being duly advised in the premises, hereby finds as follows: 
1. Defendants T. Lamar Dewsnup and Aletha Dewsnup originally executed 3 
Promissory Note in favor of the Plaintiffs. These Notes, state, in part: 
In case of default in the payment of any installment of principal or 
interest as herein stipulated, then it shall be optional for the legal 
holder of this Note to declare the entire principal sum hereof due and 
payable; and proceedings may at once be instituted for the recovery 
of the same by law, with accrued interests and costs, including 
reasonable attorney's fees. 
2. From the inception of this matter to December 5,1980, Plaintiffs were required to 
expend Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees in an attempt to collect amounts 
due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants. 
3. The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and attorneys fees expended by the 
Plaintiffs were expended in an effort to collect the sums due under the Promissory Notes. The Five 
Thousand Dollars ($5,000) was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually 
31 \Timm\4\FOF-COL Attorney's Fees 2 
780 
performed and the expenditures and the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter. 
4. From December 5,1980, to April29,1994, Plaintiffs were required to expendEighty-
three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees 
in an attempt to collect amounts due under the Promissory Notes executed by Defendants, and to 
protect Plaintiffs security for the payment of said notes. 
5. The Eighty-three Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($83,911.67) 
was paid for costs actually incurred and for legal work actually performed and the expenditures and 
the legal work performed were reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute the matter and to 
preserve Plaintiffs' interest in the property which secured payment of all sums due under the 
Promissory Notes. 
6. Of the Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars and 67/100 ($88,911.67) 
paid by Plaintiffs between the inception of this case and April 29, 1994, Eleven Thousand Eight 
Hundred Ninety-six Dollars and 07/100 ($11,896.07) were taxes on the property which served as 
security for payment of the Promissory Notes. The taxes were paid to avoid a tax sale of the property 
and in order to preserve the Plaintiffs' security interest. 
7. The Court finds that between December 5, 1980, and the award of Summary 
Judgment by the District Court on April 14,1981, work was performed to collect sums due under 
the Promissory Notes and to collect sums due for an advance paid by Plaintiffs under an Assignment 
of Contract, which Assignment of Contract also served as security for the payment of sums due 
under the Promissory Notes. 
3 l\Timm\4\FOF-COL Attorney's Fees 3 ' * * 
8. The Court finds that the attorneys fees expended for legal work during the time 
between December 5, 1980 and April 14, 1981 are not segregable and not allocable to separate 
causes of action, as pursuit of both causes of action was necessary to collect amounts due under the 
Promissory Notes and to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property. 
9. The Court finds that all fees and costs were reasonable under the circumstances of 
this case. The Court further finds that Defendant's repeated bankruptcy filings and efforts to prevent 
non-judicial sales of the property securing payment of sums due under the Promissory Notes created 
significant cost and legal expense for the Plaintiffs. 
10. The Court finds that all costs and fees incurred in bankruptcy proceedings between 
1981 and 1994 were necessary to preserve Plaintiffs security interest in the property and were 
incurred in an effort to recover amounts due for costs and attorneys fees under the Promissory Notes 
and Trust Deed. 
11. Section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S .C. § 506) authorizes Plaintiffs to recover 
costs and attorneys fees expended in protecting their security interest in the property of Defendant 
Aletha Dewsnup. 
12. The Trust Deed which gave Plaintiffs a security interest in Aletha Dewsnup's 
property authorizes recover of costs and attorneys fees expended by Plaintiffs in conducting the non-
judicial sale of the property. 
4 782 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, and in consideration of the relevant law, 
the Court concludes as follows: 
1. On December 5, 1980, there were Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) in costs and 
attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which amounts were secured by Plaintiffs 
Trust Deed on the property.. 
2. On April 29,1994, there were Eighty-eight Thousand Nine Hundred Eleven Dollars 
and 67/100 ($88,911.67) in costs and attorneys fees due and owing on the Promissory Notes which 
amounts were secured by Plaintiffs Trust Deed on the property. 
DATED this y/^^day of >Jpvcmber, 2000. 
\F \N 
BY THE COURT: f±JL£L££o 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorneys for Defendant 
783 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17th day of November, 2000,1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail, 
to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Memorandum Decision 
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. _ _ _ CLERK 
, / f f i DEPUTY! 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS L. TMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, 
and FLOYD M. CHTLDS, Trustees of 
United Preceision Machine and 
Engineering Company Profit Sharing 
Trust; ABCO Insurance Agency, Inc., a 
Utah Corporation; and JOSEPH L. 
HENRIOD, Trustee for the ANNETTE 
JACOB TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA 
DEWSNUP, ARROW INVESTMENT 
CO. A Limited Partnership, THE 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF 
BERKELEY, IMPERIAL LAND TITLE 
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L. 
CARSON and ELAINE STRINGHAM, 
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a 
Professional Corporation, MINERAL 
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY V. 
KAPS, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 800407191 
Hon. Donald J. Eyre 
The above-entitled matter came before the court pursuant to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. The court having 
considered the relevant documents and the parties' respective arguments, being fully advised in the 
premises, for good cause appearing, makes the following ruling. 
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FACTUAL SETTING 
The facts set forth in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment are undisputed except as to the notice requirements for a trustee's sale under 
U.C. A. §57-1 -26. As described below, although Plaintiffs dispute whether notice was sent, this court 
finds that this disputed fact is not material to its decision. 
ANALYSIS AND RULING 
This case is once again before this court upon the Supreme Court's remand in Timm v. 
Dewsnup III. The Supreme Court directed the trial court to "determine what amount, if any, of 
attorney fees remained unpaid on the promissory notes when the sale was held." The Court also 
directed this court to "address the merits ofDewsnup's claim for the wrongful foreclosure of the trust 
deed property and the other claims and defenses alleged in the counterclaim. Timm v. Dewsnup, 990 
P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1999). After an evidentiary hearing on November 13, 2000, this court 
determined that $88,911.67 in costs and attorney's fees were secured by the Trust Deed on April 29, 
1994, the date of the non-judicial foreclosure sale. 
Defendants raise four issues in support of their claim that Plaintiffs wrongfully foreclosed on 
the debt that is the subject of this action: 1) the trust deed sale was barred by the statute of 
limitations, 2) Plaintiffs foreclosed on the trust deed for unsecured debt, 3) the foreclosure sale 
violated the "one-action" rule, and 4) Plaintiffs failed to give the required statutory notice of default 
and notice of sale. For the following reasons, the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
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is denied and the Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
L Standard of Review 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) allows entry of summary judgment only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." At the summary judgment stage, "a trial court should not weigh 
disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of fact exists." Draper City 
v. Estate of Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). "A genuine issue of material fact exists, 
where, on the basis of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on any material issue." 
Ron Shepherd Ins. Inc. v. Shields. 882 P.2d 650,655 (Utah 1994). The court will review the evidence 
"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co.. 902 P.2d 
1229,1230 (Utah 1995). 
IL Statute of Limitations 
Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs' trustee sale was barred by the statute of limitations under 
U.C.A. §57-1-34 and §78-12-23. Under 57-1-34, a trustee's sale must be made within the time 
allowed by law. Section 78-12-23 sets forth the statute of limitations for this action-six years. 
Defendants claim that the foreclosure sale should have commenced before June 1,1986 because the 
debt secured by the trust deed came due on June 1, 1980. 
While there is a certain simplicity in Defendants' argument, it completely ignores the effect 
3 
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of the intervening bankruptcy action. 7 U.S.C. §362(a) states that "a petition filed... operates as a stay 
applicable to all entities, of ..the commencement or continuation...a judicial, administrative, or other 
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the 
commencement of the case under this title (Bankruptcy law)." U.C.A. §78-12-41 provides that 
"When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or a statutory prohibition the time of 
the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement 
of the action." 
Defendants' cite no statutory or case law to explain why the plain language of these two 
statutes should not operate to toll the statute of limitations. In fact, Utah case law dictates that the 
statute of limitations to commence foreclosure proceedings is tolled by the effect of the two statutory 
provisions cited above. See Citv Corp. Mortgage, Inc. v. Hardy. 834 P.2d 554 (Utah 1992). 
m. Foreclosure on Unsecured Debt 
Defendants next claim that because Plaintiffs attempted to foreclose on $222,814.62 worth 
of debt, some of which was not secured by the Trust Deed (See Tirom v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381 
(Utah 1996)), the foreclosure sale was defective and Defendants are entitled to damages. 
At the time the non-judicial trustee's sale was held, Plaintiffs were acting under a valid 
summary judgment entered in their favor by the trial court that the full amount of the debt was 
secured by the Trust Deed. It wasn't until 1996 that the Supreme Court's ruled that the Arrow 
Contract debt ($49,966.21) was not secured by the Trust Deed. Defendants assert that because 
4 
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Plaintiffs included the "unsecured" debt in the payoff amount, they never had the opportunity to 
satisfy the debt and obtain a reconveyance. However, in this court's Order Granting Summary 
Judgment on February 18, 1998, Defendants were not entitled to a reconveyance of the Trust Deed 
property because "there is no competent evidence before the Court to show that any valid tender of 
payment of the costs and attorneys fees was ever made." 
Further, in the Supreme Court's Timm HI decision, they stated that "We must therefore again 
remand this case to the trial court to determine what amount, if any, of attorney fees remained unpaid 
on the promissory notes when the sale was held. It was only for that amount that the foreclosure sale 
could have legally been held." Timm v. Dewsnup. 990 P.2d 942, 945 (Utah 1999). After an 
evidentiary hearing, the amount of attorney's fees found owing at the time of the sale was 
$88,911.67. Plaintiffs are not estopped from using this figure. 
Finally, this court finds Defendants argument that they are entitled to the difference between 
the bid price ($115,000) and the amount of fees owing ($88,911.67) unpersuasive. Plaintiffs had a 
valid judgment lien. Under U.C. A. §57-1-29, the trustee has the authority after applying the proceeds 
of the sale "first, to the costs and expenses of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including 
the payment of the trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not to exceed the amount which 
may be provided for in the trust deed" to pay the balance of the proceeds "to the person or persons 
legally entitled to the proceeds." The statute gives the trustee discretion, but does not require, the 
trustee to deposit those proceeds with the court. Defendants do not challenge the validity of 
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Plaintiffs' judgment lien. 
The non-judicial foreclosure sale was not defective because the Plaintiffs included "unsecured" 
debt. Defendants offer no support for this proposition. Utah Code allows a trustee to apply the 
proceeds of a sale to those persons legally entitled to the proceeds. Defendants owed $88,911.67 in 
attorneys fees. The Plaintiffs bid in $115,00 of the debt. After applying this to the $88,911.67 the 
excess proceeds were applied to the $49,966.21 judgment lien on the Arrow Contract. 
IV. The One-Action Rule 
Defendants third claim is that the trustee's sale violated the one-action rule. They argue that 
because Plaintiffs were awarded a judgment and had elected to proceed "judicially," the subsequent 
non-judicial sale violated the one-action rule. Interpreting the one action rule to limit a creditor's 
recovery to a single remedy, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs could not proceed non-judicially on "the 
same debt" that was covered by the judgment. Defendants claim fails on a number of grounds. 
First, Defendants attempt to define "the debt" in this case as the entire amount covered by the 
trust deed, the promissory notes, and the Arrow Contract assignment. However, Defendants fail to 
recognize what they successfully argued for nearly 16 years, that this "debt" is in reality two debts, 
one secured by the trust deed and one not secured by the trust deed. It is disingenuous for Defendants 
to now attempt to argue contrary to the position they have held all along, that these were two distinct 
transactions. 
Even if these two debts are considered one debt, Defendants misconstrue the very purpose 
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of the one-action rule. It does not bar a creditor from electing to proceed with a non-judicial trustee 
sale even if judicial proceedings have commenced. The purpose of the one-action rule is to force 
creditors to proceed first against the security, and then against the debtor personally. Utah case law 
makes this very clear. Discussing U.C.A. §78-37-1, the Utah Supreme Court held that "there is no 
personal liability on the part of the mortgagor until after foreclosure or sale of the security and then 
only for the deficiency then remaining unpaid; a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment against 
the mortgagor until the security has first been exhausted." Lockhard Co. v. Equitable Realty Co., 657 
P.2d 1333,1334 (Utah 1983). "The underlying purpose of the single-action statute is to preclude the 
creditor from waiving the security and suing directly on the contract to pay money and hold the 
debtor rather than the security primarily liable." National Loan Investors, L.P.. v. Givens. 952 P.2d 
1067, 1071 (Utah 1998) (quoting Bank of Ephraim v. Davis. 581 P.2d 1001, 1003 (Utah 1978). 
The one-action rule does not bar a party who proceeds judicially from holding a non-judicial 
trustee's sale. In either action, the security is exhausted before the debtor is sued personally. In fact, 
this was exactly what this court ordered. "The trial court ordered that the Arrow property and the 
water rights described in the assignment of contract and security agreement respectively be sold at 
public auction^ Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381,1385 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). The one-
action rule only bars a creditor from proceeding both on the security and directly on the contract at 
the same time. Defendants have raised no claim that Plaintiffs attempted to hold them personally liable 
before exhausting the security. 
7 920 
V. Statutory Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale 
Defendants' final claim is that Plaintiffs failed to provide them with statutory notice of default 
and sale While in their Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment Plaintiffs dispute the allegations that Defendants never received the required notice, 
because of the decision set forth below, this court finds that this fact, while disputed, is not material 
to its ruling. Section 57-1-26(3) (not 57-1-27(2) as cited in Defendants' Memorandum) contains the 
applicable language: 
When a proper request has been made in a trust deed, a copy of any notice of default 
and of any notice of sale shall be mailed to each such person at the same time (no later 
than ten days after recordation of default for notice of default and at least 20 days 
before the sale for a notice of sale) as though a separate request therefor had been 
filed. 
Plaintiffs had a statutory duty to send written notice of default and written notice of sale. Even 
if the address listed on the trust deed was somehow defective, Plaintiffs should have followed the 
back-up procedures described in subparagraph (4), which require publication at least three times, etc. 
or personal delivery to the trustor. However, Defendants must show more than simply the failure to 
receive the required statutory notice. In the case of Progressive Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec. Realty 
Services. 743 P.2d 1158, cited by Plaintiffs and unrebutted by Defendants, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that: 
The purpose of strict notice requirements in a non-judicial sale of property secured 
by trust deed is to inform persons with an interest in the property of the pending sale 
of that property, so that they may act to protect those interests. Morrell v. Arctic 
Trading Co.. Inc., 21 Wash. App. 302, 584 P.2d 983 (1978). The objective of the 
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notice is to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If that objective is attained, immaterial 
errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency of the notice or the sale made 
pursuant thereto. Russell v. Webster Springs National Bank, 164 W. Va. 708, 265 
S.E.2d 762 (1980). A party who seeks to have a trustee sale set aside for 
irregularity, want of notice, or fraud has the burden of proving his contention, it being 
presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the sale was regular. Id. 
Defects in the notice of foreclosure sale that will authorize the setting aside of the sale 
must be those that would have the effect of chilling the bidding and causing an 
inadequacy of price. Bovce v. Hughes, 241 Ga. 357, 245 S.E.2d 308 (1978). The 
remedy of setting aside the sale will be applied only in cases which reach unjust 
extremes. McHugh v. Church. 583 P.2d 210 (Alaska 1978). 
The Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show why this sale should be overturned. They 
offer no factual evidence that the lack of statutory notice had the "effect of chilling the bidding and 
causing an inadequacy of price." This court finds that actual notice was received by Defendants as 
they could not have filed a Motion to Stay the sale a month in advance of the sale without actual 
notice. Defendants have offered no substantive reason nor support in law as to why this sale should 
be set aside for lack of notice. 
Because there are no disputed material issues of fact, as a matter of law Defendants' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on this issue is denied and Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted. 
CONCLUSION 
This court finds that there are no material issues of fact in dispute. Therefore as a matter of 
law: 1) Plaintiffs non-judicial trustee sale was not barred by the statute of limitations, 2) Plaintiffs 
were entitled to apply the proceeds of the sale to satisfy their valid judgment lien, 3) the non-judicial 
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trustee sale was not barred by the one-action rule, and 4) Defendants received actual notice of default 
and sale and failed to meet their burden of proof as to any harmful effects the lack of statutory notice 
caused. As a result of the above, Plaintiffs' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is dismissed. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs is directed to prepare a Judgment and Order consistent with this decision 
and submit it to counsel for Defendants for review and then to the court for execution. 
0DATEI^this 7$- i 
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„ourt Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that true copies of the foregoing order were mailed, postage prepaid, on the 3\ - day 
of August 2001 to the following at the addresses indicated, to wit: 
Russell A. Cline (#4298) 
CRIPPEN & CLINE L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Michael Z. Hayes (#1432) 
Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Deputy Clerk 
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Order ("Judgment") 
Michael Z. Hayes (#1432) 
Todd J. Godfrey (#6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124-1725 
Telephone: (801)272-8998 
Fax: (801)272-1551 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
LOUIS L. TIMM, JOHN NEIUWLAND, : 
and FLOYD M. CHILDS, Trustees of the : 
UNITED PRECISION MACHINE AND ORDER 
ENGINEERING COMPANY PROFIT : 
SHARING TRUST; ABCO : 
INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., a Utah : 
corporation; and JOSEPH L. HENRIOD, 
Trustee for the ANNETTE JACOB : 
TRUST, : 
Plaintiffs, : 
vs. 
T. LAMAR DEWSNUP and ALETHA : Civil No. 7191 
DEWSNUP ARROW INVESTMENT &OOH 0 7 / 3 I 
CO., a limited partnership, THE : 
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF Judge Donald J. Eyre, Jr. 
BERKELEY; IMPERIAL LAND TITLE, : 
INC., as Trustee and EUGENE L. : 
CARSON and ELAINE CARSON as : 
Beneficiaries; STRINGHAM, : 
MAZURAN, LARSEN & SABIN, a 
Professional Corporation; MINERAL : 
FERTILIZER CO., INC., and HARRY 
V. KAPS, : 
Defendants. : 
—oooOooo— 
?
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This matter came before the Court on the parties' cross Motions for Summary Judgment. 
The Court, having considered the respective Briefs of the parties, on August 29, 2001, issued a 
Memorandum Decision on the parties' cross Motions, denying Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissing 
Defendant's Counterclaim, in its entirety, with prejudice. In consideration of the above-referenced 
Memorandum Decision of the Court, it is hereby 
ORDERED, AD jnUDGED AND DECREED that the Memorandum Decision on the parties' 
cross Motions for Summary Judgment is hereby adopted as the Order of the Court and Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed, in its 
entirety, with prejudice, y 
»siA DATED this LSI day of September, 2001. 
C
 ] / ^ 
BY THE COURT 
til* )} 
YsV1'^--^ **./ 
Donald^frByse^r 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO F o S f 
CRIPPEN & CLINE 
Russell A. Cline 
Attorney for Defendant Aletha Dewsnup 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fcyffA/ day of September, 2001,1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by mailing, postage prepaid, first class United States mail, 
to the following: 
Russell A. Cline 
CRIPPEN & CLINE, L.C. 
10 West 100 South, Suite 425 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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Motion for Stay Pending Appeal 
Scott C. Pierce 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Debtor 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: 801-521-4135 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LAMAR DEWSNUP 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
LOUIS L. TIMM, et al. 
Respondents 
Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746 
(Chapter 7) 
Adversary No. 87PC-0116 
District No. 88C-08416 
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING 
APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant, Aletha Dewsnup, hereby moves the 
Court for an Order staying the Defendants/Respondent *s efforts 
to foreclose the real property which is at issue in the Appeal 
of this matter. The Appeal of this Court's decision involves 
issues of whether or not Plaintiff's may avoid the lien of the 
Defendants to the extent that it exceeds the value in the real 
property and effectively redeem the property under 11 U.S.C. 
§506. In support of this motion the Appellant states the 
following: 
1. Appellant will be extremely prejudiced if the 
Defendant is allowed to foreclose on the real property. This 
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will render the Appeal moot and effectively destroy the 
Appellant's right of Appeal in this matter. The only way 
Appellant's right to redeem the property can be preserved, while 
the issue is being decided on Appeal, is to stay any foreclosure 
sale scheduled by Defendants. 
2. Defendants/Respondents will not be prejudiced in 
that the property upon which they have a lien is not declining 
in value nor is any substantial harm going to occur to the 
property during the short time the Appeal is pending. 
Defendants' position is fully secure should the District Court 
affirm the Bankruptcy Court's judgment. The only possible 
prejudice Defendants' may receive is a slight delay in 
foreclosing on the property. 
3. The issue which has been appealed by Appellant is 
very unsettled at the current time. There are a number of 
Courts that have ruled on both sides of the issue. The majority 
of the Courts who have faced the issue have ruled in favor of 
the Appellant's position. Therefore, Appellant does have a 
likelihood of success on the merits substantial enough to 
justify this Court granting a stay pending appeal. 
4. No public policy would be offended by the granting 
of a stay pending Appeal in this matter. 
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BOND ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Appellant would move that the Court grant the 
stay pending Appeal with no bond required. The 
Defendant/Respondents, have a perfected security interest in the 
real property which is the subject matter of the Appeal. Their 
interest is fully secured and protected by the value of the 
property. The only interest to which they are entitled is the 
fair market value of the property. If the Court requires that a 
bond should be posted, the bond should only be in the form of a 
cost bond to possibly cover and costs incurred by the 
Defendants/Respondents in this Appeal. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff/Appellant hereby moves the Court 
for an Order granting a stay pending the Appeal of this action, 
preventing Defendants/Respondents from foreclosing their 
interest in the real property until the Appeal has been decided. 
Furthermore, Plaintiff/Appellant requests that the stay be 
granted without the posting of a bond. 
DATED this /3 day of January, 1989 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
)mas Thui s']ft\\ 1 lam Tho   drman 
/ / S c o t t C. P ie rce 
/ / A t t o r n e y s for Debtor 
- 4 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the n fUs 
day of January, 1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the following: 
Michael Z. Hayes, Esq. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
2180 South 3100 East, #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
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Order Granting Stay Pending Appeal 
Scott C. Pierce 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Attorneys for Debtor 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-4135 
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
LAMAR DEWSNUP and 
ALETHA DEWSNUP, 
Appellants, 
j vs . 
i 
j LOUIS L. TIMM, et al., 
Respondents. 
Bankruptcy No. 84C-01746 
(Chapter 7) 
Adversary No. 87PC-0116 
District No. 88C-08416 
ORDER GRANTING STAY PENDING 
APPEAL 
The Debtor's Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Judge Glen E. Clark on February 
1, 1989. Scott C. Pierce of McKay, Burton & Thurman appeared on 
behalf of the Appellants. Michael Z. Hayes of Mazuran, 
Verhaaren and Hayes appeared on behalf of the 
Defendants/Respondents to the Appeal. Notice appeared proper in 
all respects. 
Based upon the arguments of counsel at the hearing and 
the pleadings on file with the Court, the Court made Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on the record. Based upon the 
Findings and Conclusions, 
V* 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellants Motion for Stay 
Pending Appeal is hereby granted. The Stay will become 
effective upon the posting of a $9,900.00 bond with the Court. 
The $9,900.00 bond is for protection of the 
Defendants/Respondents during the pendency of the Appeal. The 
Bond amount is calculated as follows: $1,000.00 for taxes 
accruing; $5,000.00 for costs; and $3,900.00 for interest. 
DATED this j \ day of February, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Judge Glen E. Clark 
Bankruptcy Judge 
\ U.S. BAi'.--- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.^  - / / /* " 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on the (^ 
day of February, 1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Michael A. Hayes, Esq. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
2180 South 1300 East, #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Secretary ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
I, the undersigned Clerk of the Court, do hereby certify 
that on the day of February, 1989, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Scott C Pierce, Esq. 
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN 
Suite 1200, Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Michael A. Hayes. Esq. 
MAZURAN, VERHAAREN & HAYES 
2180 South 1300 East, #260 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
Clerk of the Court 
SCP11: 
adord 
Alleged "Tendei " Let lets 
STVVTE OF I T \ H 
DEPAMTWOEN'I 01 ' AGRICUL I URE 
350 North Redwood Road • Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 • (801) 533-5421 
SCOTT M. MATHESON 
GOVERNOR 
STEPHEN T. GILLMOR 
COMMISSIONER 
LaNar Dewsnup 
Deseret Rt. Box 42 
Delta, Utah 84624 
Deai L»a Mar* 
On November 19, 1984. your Rural Rehabilitation loan request of 
$40,000 y??c rARPnt-pri and approved by the Agriculture Advisory 
Board 
You wiii u< • • . .. HJ iii) in on .ij'i possible lo 
determine the secu, i,, needi-c i..t* neresiiitry i nf ornwj t i on Mi ill \a 
up -•: papers. 
I look loiwoivi w iicai.*ng Liciu ^ ^ J soon . 
S i n c e r e l y . 
KyleyflR. Stephens^ 
L o air P r o g r a m S u per v i f ;> < >» 
KSR/cg 
m iinsi r^ 
Associated Credit Union 
1812 South Empire Road 
P. 0. Box 30430 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN; 
We have this 26th day of August, 1988, approved a loan in the 
amount o-f TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) -For and in behalf o-f 
Aletha Dewsnup, Alan Dewsnup and Darwin Dewsnup for the purchase o-f 
property. 
Consideration for the said loan will be a Promissory Note and 
pledged collateral other than the property to be purchased with the 
proceeds o-f this loan-
Funds in the amount of TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS ($10,000.00) will be 
made available upon the completion of appropriate documentation but 
in no case later than September 1, 1988 provided that the borrowers 
furnish appropriate documents and complete closing of the loan as 
required, and that their offer for the property is accepted. 
WITNESS OUR HAND this 26th day of August, 1988. 
Associated Credit Union 
Subscribed and sworn before me this 26th day of August, 1988. 
Notary Public for State of Ut 
Residing in Bountiful, Utah 
My commission expires 6-8-91 
